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Patently Unconstitutional:
The Geographical Limitation on Prior Art
in a Small World'
Margo A. Bagley
t
INTRODUCTION
Our world is getting smaller each day. As a consequence, a
statutory provision that may have been constitutional when
originally enacted a very long time ago is now patently
unconstitutional. That provision is 35 U.S.C. § 102, which
excludes evidence of foreign public knowledge or use of an
invention from being considered in U.S. patentability
decisions. 2
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Washington University School of Law. The author also would like to thank
Anita Bernstein, Bob Brauneis, Dorothy Brown, Bill Buzbee, Martha Duncan,
Cynthia Ho, Paul Heald, Tom Irving, Mark Lemley, Marc Miller, Ruth
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critique. Thanks also to William J. Haines and Erica Beck of the Emory Law
Library and to Jeremy Flax, Mathew Kannady, Terriea Lipscomb, and Marni
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1. The title alludes to the song "It's a Small World." It's a Small World,
DISNEY'S THEME PARK SING-ALONG, available at http://disney.go.coml
disneyrecords/sing-alongs/themeparks/media/smallworld.wav. The song's
conclusion that "there's so much that we share that it's time we're aware it's a
small world after all" is quite apropos of the issue of geographical limitations
on prior art in U.S. patent law.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). The problematic portion of 35 U.S.C. § 102, its
geographical limitation on prior art, first appeared in U.S. law in the Patent
Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117. The limitation in § 102(b) is illustrative:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ... the invention was
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United
States ....
679
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Section 102's geographical limitation is particularly
problematic with respect to public knowledge or use of
inventions in developing countries. The neem tree controversy
provides a fitting example of the types of problems the
limitation engenders.3 The neem tree is indigenous to India
and is called "curer of all ailments"4 and "the village
pharmacy."5 Its fruit, leaves, seeds, and bark have been freely
used by the people of India for two millennia as, among other
things, a natural pesticide, contraceptive, toothbrush, soap,
feedstock, and fuel; and as a treatment for ailments ranging
from septic sores to ulcers.6 It has been called the "Tree of the
21st Century," because almost every part of the tree has
multiple, substantial, environmentally friendly uses. 7
Yet all is not well with neem. In the early 1990s, W.R.
Grace (Grace), a multinational corporation of U.S. origin,
obtained several U.S. patents on pesticide products derived
from the neem tree and on methods of making and using those
products. 8 The issuance of the patents created an uproar in
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (emphasis added).
3. See Craig D. Jacoby & Charles Weiss, Recognizing Property Rights in
Traditional Biocultural Contribution, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 74, 75-76 (1997)
(describing the neem tree dispute as evidence of the need for a new property
regime that protects traditional biological contributions); Emily Marden, The
Neem Tree Patent: International Conflict Over the Commodification of Life, 22
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 279, 282 (1999) (discussing the western use of and
property rights protection for biological resources in the context of the neem
tree dispute); Steven Mark, Harmonization or Homogenization? The
Globalization of Law and Legal Ethics-An Australian View Point, 34 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1173, 1181-82 (noting that W.R. Grace's U.S. and European
patents on neem extracts "had a direct economic impact upon Indian society");
Charles R. McManis, The Interface Between International Intellectual Property
and Environmental Protection: Biodiversity and Biotechnology, 76 WASH.. U.
L.Q. 255, 257 (1998); Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of Traditional Knowledge,
2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 11-13 (2001) (stating that neem is not prior art
because the issue of prior art "has not been resolved yet at an international
level"); Michael D. Lemonick, Seeds of Conflict, TIME, Sept. 25, 1995, at 50, 50
(discussing the issue of rights to biological resources and arguing that W.R.
Grace's actions would not "keep farmers from using neem seeds in traditional
ways").
4. Mark, supra note 3, at 1181; Lemonick, supra note 3, at 50 (stating
that neem is known "in Sanskrit as sarva roga nivarini, 'the curer of all
ailments").
5. McManis, supra note 3, at 257.
6. Id. at 258; The Neem Tree: Medicinals, at http://www.theneemtree.
com/medicinals.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2001).
7. Neem Foundation, Neem Foundation: Towards a Greener World, at
http://www.neemfoundation.org/intro.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2002).
8. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,281,618 (issued Jan. 24, 1994) (patenting
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many quarters since the "free tree," as neem is also called,
seemed to have entered a. type of captivity. 9 Activists tried to
get the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to
revoke one of the patents, 10 but the patent was deemed valid
over the evidence presented (limited, by statute, to prior
patents or printed publications). "
At the same time, Grace (in conjunction with the United
States Department of Agriculture) also applied for and
obtained neem-related patents from the European Patent
Office (EPO). In 1995, one of these patents 12 was targeted by
the "Neem Team,"13 a group composed of two Indian non-
governmental organizations 14 and the Health and Environment
Minister of Belgium. The group requested that the EPO revoke
the patent because its subject matter did not meet basic
patentability requirements of the European Patent Convention
(EPC).15 Evidence supporting the notice included, in addition
pesticide compositions containing neem seed extracts and characterized by
non-degrading solvent systems and high concentration of azadirachtin, the
active ingredient in neem extract); U.S. Patent No. 5,124,349 (issued June 23,
1992) (patenting pesticide compositions containing neem seed extracts and
characterized by non-degrading solvent systems); U.S. Patent No. 5,001,146
(issued Mar. 19, 1991) (patenting pesticide compositions containing neem seed
extracts, characterized by non-degrading solvent systems); U.S. Patent No.
4,946,681 (issued Aug. 7, 1990) (patenting a process producing stable solutions
of neem seed extract).
9. The botanical name for the neem tree is Azadirachta indica, and is
derived from the Persian words for "free tree," Azad darakht. Vandana Shiva,
Free Tree, Hindustan Times Online, at http://www.hindustantimes.coml
nonframI090600/detOPIOl.htm, (June 9, 2000) (on file with author); see also
Int'l Federation of Organic Agricultural Movements (IFOAM), Neem Patent
Revoked!!-Major Victory Against Biopiracy, at http://www.ifoam.org/
press/winfinal-neu.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2002) [hereinafter Neem Patent
Revoked] (stating the neem tree's scientific name means "free tree").
10. Lemonick, supra note 3, at 50.
11. Reexamination certificate, U.S. Patent No. 5,124, 349 (issued Oct. 20,
1998). For patentability determinations, § 102 prevents consideration of
evidence of foreign knowledge or use of a claimed invention from being used in
patentability determinations. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
12. European Patent No. 0436 257 Al (issued July 10, 1991) (patenting an
insecticide and fungicide products derived from neem seed extract and the
methods of making and using the products).
13. Shiva, supra note 9, at http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/
090600/detOPIOl.htm.
14. Neem Patent Revoked, supra note 9 ("The Legal Opposition [was]
lodged [by] Indian scientist Vandana Shiva, IFOAM President Linda Bullard,
[and the] Environment Minister of Belgium.").
15. Back Where It Belongs, 9 DOWN TO EARTH 13, 13 (2000), at
http://www.cseindia.org/html/dte/dteOO000615/dtenews.html [hereinafter
2003]
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to printed publications, affidavits attesting to public use of the
invention by researchers in India prior to the filing of Grace's
application. 16 The EPO found the evidence of foreign public use
compelling and revoked the patent on May 10, 2000, noting
that the claims were not novel in view of prior public use of the
tree in India. 17
Why was one Grace neem patent revoked by the EPO while
a related patent was upheld by the USPTO? One of the
culprits may have been § 102's geographical limitation on prior
art.'8 Evidence of foreign use of the invention that was key to
Back Where It Belongs]. The notice of opposition requested revocation on the
grounds that the patent lacked novelty and an inventive step (i.e.,
nonobviousness), had insufficient disclosure, and also that it was contrary to
morality, in violation of European Patent Convention (EPC) Articles 53(a),
54(1)-(2), 56, and 83, respectively. Convention on the Grant of European
Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270, 286, 291 available at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/mal.html (last updated July
2002) [hereinafter EPC]. For more on the European Patent Office (EPO) and
EPC, see infra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
16. Decision Revoking European Patent No. 0436257, European Patent
Office, at 2-3 (Feb. 13, 2001) (available from European Patent Office; on file
with author).
17. Id. at 1, 9-13. Apparently, the corroborated testimony of an Indian
researcher, Mr. A. D. Phadke, was instrumental in the EPO Opposition
Division's decision to revoke the patent based on prior public use of the
claimed invention. Id. at 9. As stated in the "Grounds for Decision":
The basic statement of Mr. Phadke both in the above affidavit and
his testimony was that there were field trials in summer 1985 and
1986 in... Western India which were open to an unlimited number of
local farmers.... [H]e further specified that the fungicidal effect
under discussion has been observed ... and presented a list of sixteen
farmers plus their telephone numbers who were present at the trials.
He further specified ... that not only his employees carried out the
trials, but also that he himself carried out some of the tests together
with farmers whose names he could present. Additionally, he stated
that the farmers did not only watch the trials, but were given samples
of the various extracts and the recipes to prepare them.
Accordingly it is clearly established when and where the prior use
took place. Additionally, it has been made clear that the trials in fact
were made available to the public.
Id. The two-day opposition hearing at the EPO in Munich, Germany drew
protesters, who carried signs protesting the patenting of neem, symbolically
"freed" a neem tree from patents, and presented to EPO representatives
signatures of 500,000 Indian citizens demanding the revocation of all patents
on neem. Anna Salleh, Victory Over Biopiracy, Australian Broadcasting
Corporation (ABC) Online, at http://www.abc.net.au/science/news/print/
print_128927.htm (May 19, 2000); Back Where It Belongs, supra note 15, at
http://www.cseindia.org/html/dte/dte20000615/dtenews.htm.; Neem Patent
Revoked, supra note 9, at http://www.ifoam.org/press/win-final neu.html.
18. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b), (g) (2000). The claims in the United States and
European patents, while similar and related, are not identical. Compare U.S.
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the revocation of the European Grace patent would not be
admissible to challenge the validity of any related U.S.
patent(s) on neem 19 because of the geographical limitation on
prior art codified in various subsections of § 102 of the Patent
Act of 1952.20 In a nutshell, § 102 excludes evidence of foreign
public knowledge or use of an invention from being considered
in both novelty and nonobviousness determinations if the
evidence is not contained in a patent or printed publication.21
The statutory provision that requires classification of
information as relevant or non-relevant based on its
geographical origin and form conflicts with the very source of
its power: The United States Constitution. Article 1, section 8,
clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution (Intellectual Property Clause)
authorizes Congress to grant exclusive rights for limited times
to inventors for the purpose of "promot[ing] the progress of the
Patent 4,946,681 (issued Aug. 7, 1990) with European Patent No. 0 43 256
(issued July 10, 1991). Consequently, the specific evidence found persuasive
in the EPO decision may not have impacted the U.S. patent's claims. It is
possible other foreign public use evidence exists, however, that may have
invalidated claims in one or more of the U.S. neem patents. Moreover, in U.S.
reexamination proceedings, only evidence in patents or printed publications
can be used to invalidate a patent. 37 C.F.R. § 1.552(a) (2001); see also Dow
Chem. Co. v. Astro-Valcour, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (N.D.N.Y. 2000);
David Downes, Using Intellectual Property as a Tool to Protect Traditional
Knowledge: Recommendations for Next Steps, http://www.ciel.org/Publications/
publac.html (Nov. 21, 1997). Mr. Downes noted that with the Grace neem-
related patents,
[M]any of these patented inventions are different from traditional
uses of neem. They apply only to the specified inventions, without
interfering with Indian farmers .... However, it is possible that some
of the patents were not truly novel because in fact they not only drew
upon but consisted of traditional knowledge.
Id.
19. The EPO patent claimed priority from U.S. Patent Application No.
456,762 (filed Dec. 20, 1989), from which several U.S. patents also claimed
priority, even though Application No. 456,762 itself ultimately was abandoned
and never issued as a patent. A search of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office website (http://www.uspto.gov) revealed more than 70 patents with
claims relating in some way to neem (on file with author). This Article does
not suggest that any one of those particular patents (or any other for that
matter) is indeed invalid, because novel and nonobvious inventions can build
on, or be derived from, publicly available information. Rather, this Article
simply points out that evidence necessary to accurately assess validity in a
manner consistent with the U.S. Constitution may be improperly excluded by
§ 102's geographical limitation on prior art.
20. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, Pub. L. 106-113, 66 Stat. 797, codified at
35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b), (g) (2000).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b). Public knowledge, use, or sale of an invention
"in this country," i.e., the United States, does constitute relevant prior art. Id.
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useful arts".22
On its face, a geographical limitation that allows an
invention that was known or used in another country to be
patented here may seem to promote the progress of technology
in the United States by providing U.S. citizens with access to
information and products that they otherwise might not have
had.23 Additionally, if the Framers' goal was only to promote
the introduction of useful technology to the United States,
§ 102's geographical limitation would certainly further that
goal by granting inventors exclusive U.S. rights over technology
known and used in other parts of the world. 24 Yet that clearly
was not the only goal. From its earliest days, the Intellectual
Property Clause has been understood to prohibit the grant of
patents (1) to non-inventors and (2) for inventions in the public
domain, even if the grant of a patent might have expedited the
introduction of beneficial technology within U.S. borders.25
22. U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 8.
23. See e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504 (issued Mar. 28, 1995) (patenting
the administration of turmeric to a wound in order to promote healing); Sanjay
Kumar, India Wins Battle with USA Over Turmeric Patent, 350 THE LANCET
724 (Sept. 6, 1997); India Prevents Patenting of Turmeric, THE STATESMAN,
Aug. 24, 1997 at 17. In 1995, two researchers from the University of
Mississippi obtained a U.S. patent on methods of using the spice turmeric to
heal wounds. Kumar, supra, at 724. The use of turmeric as a wound-healing
agent has been known in India for centuries. Id. If there were no published
records regarding the use of turmeric in the way described in the patent, a
person in the United States might think § 102's geographical limitation is a
good idea since it allows the patenting and dissemination of useful
information, here a wound healing treatment, that might be hard for a U.S.
consumer to access otherwise. The patent gives its holders the right to
exclude others from using that method (or pay "rent" in the form of license fees
or premium monopoly based pricing), however, and to the extent the
information is publicly accessible in the legal sense consumers now have to
pay monopoly prices for something that is not novel. Furthermore, any
limitation on one's ability to patent information, such as barriers against
patents on information that has already been published, and on patents
derived from an invention by someone else, may keep desirable goods from
reaching consumers. In the turmeric case, the patent was invalidated based
on the claimed method's being disclosed in various printed publications.
24. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (stating that the owner of a U.S. patent
has the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or
importing that invention in the United States during the term of the patent).
25. See discussion infra at notes 26, 65, 97. For example, the First
Congress deliberately excluded patents of importation from U.S. law in the
first patent act, even though such patents would have provided incentives for
intrepid entrepreneurs to import much needed technology from England,
France, and other locales, to the fledgling nation. See infra note 62 and
accompanying text.
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While the Framers believed incentives were needed to
advance the progress of technological development in this
country, they also were well aware, from pre- and post-Statute
of Monopolies abuses in England, of the dangers to the public
domain of monopoly-like grants of power over existing
information. 26 To safeguard against the repetition of such
abuses in America, the Intellectual Property Clause contains
clear constraints on the ways Congress can promote the
progress of useful arts by granting exclusive rights for limited
times to true inventors of new (and nonobvious) technology.27
Understanding that the Framers of the Intellectual
Property Clause sought to avoid the granting of patents on
"old" information informs a reading of the Intellectual Property
Clause that requires the inclusion of all publicly accessible
26. See Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jam., c. 3, § 6 (Eng.) (providing
that patents shall not be used in any way "mischievous to the state, by raising
prices of commodities at home," nor shall they "hurt... trade" or be "generally
inconvenient"); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17,
1788), in LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1769-1793, at
421, 427 (1865) ("With regard to monopolies they are justly classed among the
greatest nuisances in Government .... Monopolies are sacrifices of the many
to the few. Where the power is in the few it is natural for them to sacrifice the
many to their own partialities and corruptions."); see also Paul J. Heald &
Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual
Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV.
1119, 1144 (2000). In the words of the former Commissioner of Patents,
Americans generally detest monopoly in the true sense of the
term because it makes possible the ruthless exercise of power. Indeed,
the American Revolution was precipitated by popular resentment of
the monopoly on tea held by the East India Co. It would, therefore,
have been exceedingly strange if, only a few years later, the delegates
sent to the Constitutional Convention by Massachusetts and the other
Colonies had been willing to sanction an equivalent form of monopoly
under the new government they were creating.
Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee, 76th Cong.,
838, 840 (1939) (statement of Conrad P. Coe, Commissioner of Patents).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see John Golden, Biotechnology,
Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the
American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 104-05 (2001) ("[B]ecause patents
provide this spur to progress through a monopoly grant, there is an ever-
present concern that they will overreach-granting property rights beyond
what inventors legally deserve, or (of more fundamental concern) beyond what
best promotes the development and dissemination of technological products.");
see also Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of
the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 46 (2000) ("[Tlhere
are limits on Congress's power to create and extend intellectual property
interests. Such limits are 'internal' in the sense that they are the result of the
very same constitutional provision giving rise to Congress's power in the first
place, the [Intellectual Property] Clause of the Constitution.").
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information as prior art in patentability determinations. Such
a reading is consistent with "fidelity"28 because it provides "a
reading in the new context that has the same meaning as a
different reading had in a different context." 29 The new context
is the technologically advanced, twenty-first century world of
diminishing borders and open markets, where scientists seek
inventive inspiration in remote corners of the globe with an
ease unknown in 1836, the year the first prior art geographical
limitation entered U.S. patent law. 30  Thus, properly
28. Fidelity refers to the notion of remaining faithful to original
constitutional principles. See Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The
Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998).
29. Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and
Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 396 (1995). As Professor Lessig notes,
Readings of the Constitution change. This is the brute fact of
constitutional history and constitutional interpretation. At one time,
the Constitution is read to say one thing. At another, the same text is
read to say something else. No theory that ignored these changes, or
that presumed that constitutional interpretation could go on without
these changes, could be a theory of our Constitution.
Id. Professor Lessig theorizes that in the face of a changed context, which may
be due to technological advances, the proper way to maintain fidelity is to
change the reading of the constitutional text, to translate, if you will, the
original meaning in to the new context. Id. at 396, 398. Such a changed
reading of the Intellectual Property Clause clearly supports elimination of §
102's geographical limitation on prior art. But see Michael C. Dorf, Integrating
Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original
Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1787 (2000) (critiquing Lessig's theory as failing
to account for much of modern constitutional law). However, reading the
Intellectual Property Clause as requiring the inclusion of all publicly
accessible information as prior art is arguably not even a different reading,
but rather a return to the original reading, since the first two patent acts
contained no geographical limitation on prior art. See Patent Act of Apr. 10,
1790 (An Act to Promote the Progress of the Useful Arts), ch. 7., 1 Stat. 109
(repealed by Patent Act of 1793). For other theories of the evolution of
constitutional interpretation and rules, see Michael C. Dorf & Barry
Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 61, 77
n.67 (2000).
30. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117; see McManis, supra note 3, at
269-75 (discussing the creation of several bioprospecting agreements between
multinational corporations, government institutions, and universities, and
developing country governments and indigenous groups in places such as
Costa Rica, Micronesia, and Ecuador for the identification of information that
may lead to patentable inventions); Anthony Faiola, Amazon Cash Crop,
WASH. POST, July 9, 1999, at A20 (quoting a Brazilian traditional healer as
saying that "[floreigners come around asking me all sorts of questions" and
that "[y]ou can tell they're not tourists-they're scientists!"); see also Judith
Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE
L.J. 619, 620 (2001) ("Technology permits easy transgeographic exchanges
that diminish the significance of physical boundaries. Transnational
organizations promulgate worldwide legal norms, affecting practices within
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interpreted, the Intellectual Property clause prohibits the grant
of patents on inventions in the public domain, i.e., inventions
that are not novel and nonobvious because they are "open to
the people of this country, as well as of others, upon reasonable
inquiry."31 Because the current geographical limitation on
prior art allows the patenting of inventions in the public
domain, it is unconstitutional and must be eliminated.32
The geographical limitation on prior art was not in the first
two U.S. patent acts, but it has been in U.S. patent law for over
150 years. 33 While not directly ruled on by the Supreme Court,
the limitation has been mentioned in Court decisions on
occasion.34 Thus one legitimately might be skeptical that a
provision this old could be unconstitutional. Yet not all
statutes ultimately deemed unconstitutional start out that way;
some become that way over time.35 It is possible that in 1836,
the geographical limitation was not unconstitutional because
difficulties associated with obtaining and verifying evidence of
foreign public knowledge or use caused the bulk of such
knowledge to be effectively inaccessible to the interested public
and thus outside the public domain.36 Due to advances in
technology and changed world conditions, such reasoning is no
longer tenable because evidence of foreign public knowledge or
use is arguably as accessible in the twenty-first century as
foreign patents and printed publications were in 1836. 37
nation-states.").
31. Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 497 (1850).
32. See infra notes 92-174 and accompanying text.
33. See discussion infra Part I.B.
34. Generally, the Court simply recites a subsection of 35 U.S.C. § 102 at
issue in the case. See, e.g., Pfaffv. Wells Elec., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 57 (1998)
(referring to § 102(g)); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 148 (1989) (referring to Rev. St. §§ 4886-4887, 4923, the predecessors
to 35 U.S.C. § 102 (a)-(b), (g)); Gandy v. Main Belting Co., 143 U.S. 587, 592-93
(1892); Gayler, 51 U.S. at 497 (quoting Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat.
119). In dicta, the Gayler Court further explained the geographical limitation
even though their applicability was not at issue. Id. at 496-98; see infra notes
70-71 and accompanying text.
35. See discussion infra Part II.
36. See Donald S. Chisum, Foreign Activity: Its Effect on Patentability
Under United States Law, 11 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT 26, 36
(1980).
37. See discussion infra Part II. B. Of course, all foreign public knowledge
or use is not equally accessible, just as all patents and printed publications are
not equally accessible. Public accessibility, the key to prior art legitimacy, is
determined on a case-by-case basis and is fact specific. Nevertheless, this
Article argues that, on the whole, the accessibility of foreign public knowledge
2003]
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Moreover, the policy ramifications of the § 102 limitation
are significant. First, returning to the neem tree controversy,
the EPO's revocation of Grace's patent would allow other
companies to make and sell products covered by the patent in
Europe. If Grace patented the same invention in the United
States, where § 102(b)'s geographical limitation would bar
evidence of public use of the invention in India, European
consumers could have competitive market access to an
invention only available to U.S. consumers at monopoly pricing
levels.38  Second, the United States fiercely condemns the
pirating of U.S. intellectual property by trading partners, often
developing countries, imposing trade sanctions where deemed
necessary to force countries to implement adequate
protections.3 9 Yet, the § 102 geographical limitation facilitates
or use should be considered at least equal to the categorical accessibility of
foreign patents and printed publications in 1836 and thus should be treated
the same for novelty and nonobviousness purposes.
38. In addition to the EPC, the patent laws of Japan, Canada, Mexico and
many other countries also do not contain geographical limitations on prior art
(although some other countries, such as Australia and Kuwait, still do.) See
notes 191 and 204 (describing patent law of all EPC contracting states, Japan,
and Canada) and the Collection of Laws for Electronic Access (CLEA), at
http://clea.wipo.int (providing the patent laws of Mexico, Australia, and
Kuwait), infra. Consequently U.S. consumers would theoretically be at a
pricing disadvantage to foreign consumers as well, assuming the subject
products are available in those markets.
It must be noted, however, that § 102's geographical limitation is not the
only § 102 provision that differs from the patent laws of other countries.
Section 102(b) also gives an inventor a one-year grace period, from the first
time the invention is sold or used publicly, in which to file a patent application
covering the invention in the United States. The EPC, for example, provides
no such grace period; thus inventions may be patentable here that are not
eligible for a European patent, resulting in the same effective disadvantage to
consumers noted above for the prior art geographical limitation. See EPC, art.
20, supra note 15, 13 I.L.M. at 280. The grace period is also controversial
internationally, but may be justifiable in that it provides the constitutionally
required incentive to innovate while allowing an inventor a limited time to
conduct a search of the prior art, prepare a patent application, and assess the
value of her invention before seeking patent protection. See Baxter Int'l, Inc.
v. Cobe Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that allowing
the inventor a reasonable time to determine the potential economic value of a
patent is one of the policies underlying the public use bar's one-year grace
period). No such substantive justifications underlie the geographical
limitation on prior art.
39. See United States Trade Representative, 2000 Special 301 Report,
http://www.ustr.gov/html/special.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2002). The United
States Trade Representative (USTR), under the Special 301 Provisions of the
Trade Act of 1974, identifies trading partners that "deny fair and equitable
market access to United States artists and industries that rely upon
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the "pirating" of unpatented, unpublished, traditional
knowledge40 and genetic resources from developing countries,
exacerbating feelings of ill will toward the United States for its
hypocritical stance in this area.
Third, harking back to the neem tree example, to the
extent indigenous holders of knowledge regarding the invention
have shared that information with someone who later patents
an obvious variant of the invention, they may receive no benefit
or compensation for sharing that knowledge.41 Moreover, such
indigenous knowledge holders are summarily denied the ability
to supply the U.S. market with products covered by the
patent.42 The geographical limitation thus may act, in a sense,
as a trade barrier, retarding the ability of affected nations to
become independent of foreign aid through the growth of
domestic export industries. Consequently, not only is the § 102
geographical limitation on prior art unconstitutional, it is also
bad policy. While the number of patents implicating the
geographical limitation should be relatively modest, the
expense and international ill will they generate is significant.
intellectual property protection." Id. For example, the USTR suspended tariff
preferences for Honduras after concluding that its government was not taking
adequate steps to combat piracy of U.S. intellectual property. United States
Trade Representative, Trade Preferences for Honduras Restored, at
http://www.ustr.gov/release/198/07/98-65.pdf (July 21, 1998).
There is no geographical limitation on the sources of evidence that can be
used under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) to show that an applicant is not a true inventor.
35 U.S.C. § 102(f). Although actions under § 102(f) are fairly rare, the Patent
Act's geographical limitation may facilitate this type of piracy since derivation
can be hard to prove and the presence of limitations on this type of evidence in
other subsections of 102 may cause such evidence to be given less weight in a
102(f) dispute. Moreover, the geographical limitation may also facilitate the
patenting of inventions that would be obvious in view of derived information.
40. Various definitions exist for the phrase "traditional knowledge." For
purposes of this Article, the definition supplied by the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD) will suffice. See Convention on Biological
Diversity, June 5, 1992, art. VIII, § j, 31 I.L.M. 818, 825-26. The CBD defines
traditional knowledge as "knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous
and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity." Id.
41. See Neem Patent Revoked, supra note 9, at http://www.ifoam.org/press/
win_finalneu.html. Grace may have received information on the claimed
invention from an Indian researcher. Id.
42. Farmers and indigenous groups in developing countries are poorly
positioned to contest the validity of a U.S. patent either by instituting a
reexamination proceeding in the USPTO or district court litigation to
invalidate the patent. See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text
(describing a patent that effectively prohibits importing Mexican Enola beans,
which has prevented Mexican exporters from expanding their market).
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The neem controversy is not an isolated incident. 43
Other commentators on the geographical limitation in
§ 102 have considered many of the policy issues surrounding
the provision. Scholars, however, have not considered the
limitation's violation of constitutional strictures. 44 This Article
argues that the geographical limitation in § 102 must be
eliminated because it conflicts with the constraints embodied in
the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 45
43. Other recent controversies regarding the patenting of information
known or used but not necessarily patented or published in other countries
include those related to the Mexican Enola bean patent, Ecuadorian
Ayahuasca plant patent, Nigerian serendipity berry patent, and Indian
turmeric patent, to name a few. See, e.g., Ragavan, supra note 3, at 11 (noting
that the Indian government opposed a U.S. patent application for turmeric
and that the application was rejected); Leanne M. Fecteau, Note, The
Ayahuasca Patent Revocation: Raising Questions About Current U.S. Patent
Policy, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 69, 70 (2001) (describing that Amazon tribal
leaders were angered after an American patented a strain of the ayahuasca
vine and that more than 400 indigenous tribes and South American groups
obtained a rejection of the patent); Lester I. Yano, Comment, Protection of the
Ethnobiological Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples, 41 UCLA L. REV. 443, 486
(1993) (concluding that the "utilization or loss of ethnobiological knowledge
without compensation is becoming an issue of growing concern among
indigenous peoples"); Jonathan Friedland, As Two Men Vie to Sell Yellow
Beans, Litigation Sprouts, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2000, at Al (describing the
controversy over the Enola bean); ETC Group, Biotech Industry Sweet on
African Plant Proteins (Sept. 28, 1997), http://www.rafi.org/article.
asp?newsid=69 (reporting that "patent claims by the biotech industry fail to
recognize or reward" African communities for sweeteners derived from plants
used by tribes for centuries, such as the serendipity berry). Of course, not
everyone agrees that § 102's geographical limitation is bad. See William
LaMarca, Reevaluating the Geographical Limitation of 35 U.S.C. § 102(h):
Policies Considered, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 25, 50-52 (1996) (urging that the
geographical limitation of § 102(b) remain in place for situations of
undisclosed third party conduct, but be removed where an inventor
commercializes her invention outside of the United States beyond the limits of
the 102(b) grace period).
44. See Chisum, Foreign Activity, supra note 36, at 48 (concluding that
there is no longer a justification for domestic-foreign distinctions in U.S.
patent law); Shayana Kadidal, Subject-Matter Imperialism? Biodiversity,
Foreign Prior Art and the Neem Patent Controversy, 37 IDEA 371, 395-401
(1997) (criticizing § 102's geographical distinctions); LaMarca, supra note 43,
at 52-53 (proposing a qualified modification to § 102); Marden, supra note 3, at
295 (urging various steps to reform intellectual property laws); Daniel H.
Bliss, Comment, Bridge Over Troubled Water: Extending the Public Use Bar to
Foreign Countries, 1987 DETROIT C. L. REV. 65, 67 (1987) (arguing for changes
in the public use doctrine and discussing the evidentiary problems involved in
proving foreign public use); Fecteau, supra note 43, at 72-73 (summarizing
suggested reforms to U.S. patent policy).
45. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. For purposes of this Article, this
provision will be called the Intellectual Property Clause. See also Heald &
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While the limitation may have been justifiable when originally
enacted in 1836, it is clearly unconstitutional now. Also, while
facially treating all foreign public knowledge or use the same, it
disproportionately impacts and discriminates against
indigenous groups in developing countries, a distinction that is
hypocritical for the United States to make in view of its stance
on the piracy of U.S. intellectual property in developing
countries. Moreover, by being out of step with laws in other
major patent granting countries, the § 102 limitation may
disadvantage U.S. consumers, whom it was originally designed
to benefit. 46
Part I of this Article provides an overview of § 102 of the
Patent Act, the role of prior art in the patentability analysis,
and the origin of the limitation on relevant non-patent, non-
published art to that existing "in this country." Part II then
analyzes the constitutional deficiency of the limitation in light
of the express and implied purposes of the Intellectual Property
Clause as informed by judicial decisions, technological changes,
global contraction, and expanded notions of inventive research
sources. Policy concerns are the focus of Part III, which
discusses how § 102's geographical limitation facilitates forms
of "biopiracy," conflicts with the policies underlying § 102(b),
and is at odds with global patent harmonization efforts. Part
III also explores the likely impact of elimination of the § 102
geographical limitation on U.S. patents. This Article
ultimately concludes that eliminating the geographical
limitation on prior art is a necessary step for the United States
to take in this small, small world.
Sherry, supra note 26, at 1123 (asserting that limits on the Intellectual
Property Clause are "principles of constitutional weight").
46. See, e.g., infra notes 202-04 and accompanying text (describing
Japan's rejection of its section 102-like provision, based on fears that a
geographical limitation on prior art would cause Japan to fall behind in
research and development because inventors would be prohibited from using
innovations available in other countries, ultimately denying benefits to
consumers). Japan eliminated its geographical limitation in 1999, Canada did
the same in 1989, and all European Union countries and other members of the
European Patent Convention have been without geographical prior art
limitations since at least 1977, when the EPC went into effect. See infra notes
191-99. Also other countries, such as the United States other close neighbor,
Mexico, do not limit prior art based on geography or form. See Mexican
Industrial Property Law, available at http://clea.wipo.int (last visited Nov. 22,
2002).
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I. PATENTABILITY AND PRIOR ART
Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution authorizes
Congress "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."47
Congress chose to promote progress in the useful arts by
establishing a patent system whereby, in exchange for
adequately disclosing a useful, novel, and nonobvious
invention 48 to the public in a patent document, an inventor
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
48. The disclosure requirements (written description, enablement, best
mode, and distinct claiming) are codified in 35 U.S.C. § 112, which provides, in
pertinent part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. The
specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). In addition to being useful, the invention must also be
of the right type. Consequently, 35'U.S.C. § 101 provides: "Whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." Id. § 101
(emphasis added).
35 U.S.C. § 102 contains the novelty requirement and provides:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in
this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application
for patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or
was the subject of an inventor's certificate, by the applicant or his
legal representatives or assigns in a foreign country prior to the date
of the application for patent in this country on an application for
patent or inventor's certificate filed more than twelve months before
the filing of the application in the United States, or
(e) The invention was described in- (1) an application for
patent, published under section 122(b), by another filed in the United
States before the invention by the applicant for patent,...
or (2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in
the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent,...
or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be
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would obtain a right to exclude others from making, using,
selling, or offering to sell the invention for a period of years.49
Both the novelty and nonobviousness requirements
mandate a comparison of the invention with the prior art.50 35
U.S.C. § 102 defines relevant prior art for both novelty and
nonobviousness analyses. 51 Prior art is defined as "knowledge
that is available, including What would be obvious from it, at a
given time, to a person of ordinary skill in an art," as long as
that information is drawn from the sources of information
identified in § 102.52 It is worth noting that an applicant need
not actually be aware of the prior art cited against her
application for the information to be considered prior art.
Knowledge of all of the relevant art is presumed on the part of
patented, or
(g)(1) during the course of an interference ... another inventor
involved therein establishes, to the extent permitted in section 104,
that before such person's invention thereof the invention was made by
such other inventor and not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed, or
(2) before such person's invention thereof, the invention was made in
this country by another inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed,
or concealed it. In determining priority of invention under this
subsection, there shall be considered not only the respective dates of
conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the
reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to
reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (emphasis added).
The nonobviousness requirement is codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103 which
provides, in pertinent part:
(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains ....
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
49. The original patent term was fourteen years from issuance. Patent
Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 110 (1848). It is currently twenty years
from the filing date, with the possibility of extensions for delays not
attributable to acts or omissions of the inventor. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271 (2000).
50. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103.
51. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
52. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453
(Fed. Cir. 1984); see also 35 U.S.C. § 102 (a)-(b),(e). Pursuant to paragraph (c)
of § 103, subject matter that qualifies as prior art only under § 102(e), (f), or
(g) cannot preclude the patentability of an invention where that subject matter
and the invention, at the time the invention was made, were commonly owned
or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person. 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(e).
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the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art.53 Thus,
§ 102 identifies the knowledge against which patentability is
assessed and details the grounds upon which an applicant can
be denied a patent based on either lack of novelty of the
invention or loss of right to the invention.
A. PRIOR ART AND 35 U.S.C. § 102
Section 102 prevents an applicant from obtaining a patent
if the claimed invention is "anticipated" by the prior art, that is,
if the invention is not "new" or novel as defined in one of the
five prior art subsections of § 102.54
Section 102's novelty, or anticipation, requirement is only
met if each and every element of the claimed invention is
disclosed in a single prior art reference. 55 Additionally, the
reference must enable a person of ordinary skill in the field of
the invention to make and use the invention.5 6  If these
requirements are not met, then a claimed invention is not
"new" because it is fully disclosed in a reference that is
accessible to the interested public.
In terms of the nonobviousness requirement, under § 103,
references that qualify as prior art under § 102, but that do not
by themselves anticipate the claimed invention, can be
combined to show that the invention is obvious. In other
53. See In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("To
determine patentability, a hypothetical person is presumed to know all the
pertinent prior art, whether or not the applicant is actually aware of its
existence." (citing In re Nilssen, 851 F.2d 1401, 1403 (Fed. Cir. 1988))); In re
Howarth, 654 F.2d 103, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1981). The Howarth court stated,
Section 102 has as one objective that only the first inventor obtain a
patent .... Foreign "patents" and foreign "printed publications"
preclude the grant of a patent whether or not the information is
commonly known. Under [§] 102 a conclusive presumption of
knowledge of such prior art is, in effect, a statutorily required fiction.
Id.
54. 35 U.S.C. § 102. Subsections (a), (e), (f), and (g) are considered novelty
provisions while subsections (b), (c), and (d) are loss of right provisions by
which an inventor loses the right to a patent because the invention is legally
deemed to lack novelty. Subsection (b) is also a prior art provision like the
novelty provisions, while subsections (c) and (d) are generally not considered
to be prior art provisions. See OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d
1396, 1401-02 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (categorizing subsections 102 (a)-(g)).
55. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
56. Id. at 1479 (citing In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). An
"enabling" reference is one that would enable one of ordinary skill in the
relevant art to practice the claimed invention. See generally Titanium Metals
Corp. of Am. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 780 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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words, the combination of references shows that all of the
claimed elements are present in the prior art and that a patent
should not issue (or if issued should be revoked) for the claimed
invention. Such combinations are allowed as long as a
suggestion or motivation, express or implied, to combine the
multiple references also comes from the prior art.57 The test is
"what the combined teachings of the references would have
suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art."58
Three of the five 102 subsections, (a), (b), and (g), contain a
geographical limitation to "this country," for non-patent, non-
printed publication prior art.59 For purposes of this analysis,
however, we will focus on the geographical limitation in §
102(b), as the prior art problems it creates are representative of
those pertaining to subsections (a) and (g) as well. 60 Section
102(b) provides:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless .... the invention was
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States [.]61
Thus, under § 102(b), relevant prior art that can be used to
invalidate a patent consists of information in a patent or
57. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
58. Id. (quoting Cable Elec. Prods, Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015,
1025 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
59. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). A fourth subsection, 102(e), also contains a
geographical limitation that also should be eliminated but is different in
nature to the three mentioned above, and will not be dealt with in this Article.
60. See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS IN PATENT
LAW 312, 314 (1998). There are two key differences between subsections
102(a) and 102(b): 1) Triggering Event: Prior art under 102(a) is determined as
of the date the applicant invented the claimed subject matter, whereas prior
art under 102(b) is determined as of the date that is one year before the U.S.
patent application filing date; and 2) Who Can Trigger It: Only a third party
can create prior art under 102(a) (since, by definition, the inventor cannot
publicly know or use the invention before she has invented it), whereas the
inventor or a third party can create prior art under 102(b) because the critical
date is tied to the filing of the patent application. See id. at 314.
Section 102(g) differs from 102(a) and (b) in that, in addition to serving as
a source of prior art (if someone made the invention in this country before the
applicant and did not abandon, suppress or conceal it, that "making" can be
used to show lack of novelty or obviousness of the claimed invention) it also
serves as the basis for the determination of priority of invention in patent
interference contests. See id. at 312. Section 102(g)'s geographical limitation
was modified in 1999 by the addition of § 102(g)(1), which removes the "in this
country" limitation only in the context of certain interference proceedings. 35
U.S.C. § 102(g)(1) (2000).
61. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (emphasis added).
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printed publication anywhere in the world, but information
concerning prior public use or sale of an invention is only
invalidating if the use or sale occurred in this country. Prior
foreign public use or sale of the invention does not count. This
geographical limitation may seem reasonable at first glance,
since justifications for denying patents to applicants in the
United States based on knowledge or use of an invention in a
faraway country may not be readily apparent. To determine if
this is only an anachronism or a justifiable distinction, we need
to explore how the limitation became part of U.S. patent law in
the first place.
B. ORIGIN OF THE SECTION 102(B) GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATION
United States patent law has not always contained a
geographical prior art limitation. The first patent act in 1790
defined prior art without regard to location, authorizing
patents only to "the first and true inventor or discoverer" of
"any useful art.., not before known or used."62 Interestingly,
H.R. 41, the patent bill that ultimately became the Patent Act
of 1790, originally contained language that would have limited
the ban on prior use to "in the United States" 63 and would have
allowed for patents of importation. 64 Those provisions were
deleted before passage of the Act, apparently because of a
belief, expressed by James Madison, that patents of
importation, which would grant exclusive rights to the first
importer (not inventor) of technology from another country to
the United States, were unconstitutional. 65
62. Patent Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109-11.
63. Edward C. Walterscheid, Charting a Novel Course: The Creation of the
Patent Act of 1790, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 445, 500, 521 (1997).
64. Id. at 501-02.
65. Id. at 502-03. The language "first and true inventor" in the English
Statute of Monopolies encompassed not only inventors, but also persons who
"imported into England a manufacture not in use there within living memory."
Walterscheid, supra note 63, at 469; see also Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jam., c.
3, § 5 (1623) (Eng.). Although patents of importation were known and used in
England (the Statute of Monopolies contained an express exception for such
patents) and France, U.S. patent law "was interpreted (and indeed intended
by Congress) to preclude patents of importation." Edward C. Walterscheid,
Patents and Manufacturing in the Early Republic, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC'Y 855, 856 (1998). Both James Madison and Alexander Hamilton
clearly suggest in their writings that they both believed patents of
importation, while potentially beneficial, were barred by the Intellectual
Property Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 865, 874-75. In a letter to Tench
Coxe dated March 28, 1790, James Madison opined: "Your idea of
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The novelty requirement in the Patent Act of 1793 was
very similar to that in the 1790 Act, the key difference being
that the invention must not have been "known or used before
the application" filing date.66 Importantly, the phrase "known
or used" was not geographically limited in any way in either
Act.
The requirement that an invention must be new to the
world, not just the United States, was confirmed and applied by
the Supreme Court in early decisions. 67 For example, in Shaw
appropriating a district of territory to the encouragement of imported
inventions is new and worthy of consideration. I cannot but apprehend
however that the clause in the constitution which forbids patents for that
purpose will lie equally in the way of your expedient." Letter of James Madison
to Tench Coxe (March 28, 1790), 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 128
(Charles F. Hobson et. al., eds, Univ. of Va. Press 1981)) (first emphasis
added).
Similarly, the final version of Alexander Hamilton's Report on
Manufactures contains the following observation:
But it is desireable [sic] in regard to improvements and secrets of
extraordinary value, to be able to extend the same benefit to
Introducers (importers], as well as Authors and Inventors; a policy
which has been practiced with advantage in other countries. Here,
however, as in some other cases, there is cause to regret, that the
competency of the authority of the National Government to the good,
which might be done, is not without a question....
But if the legislature of the Union cannot do all the good, that
might be wished, it is at least desirable, that all may be done, which
is practicable. Means for promoting the introduction of foreign
improvements, though less efficaciously than might be accomplished
with more adequate authority, will form a part of the plan intended to
be submitted in the close of this report.
10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 308 (Harold C. Syrett, ed., 1966)
(first emphasis added). That view was not shared by all, however. Notably,
George Washington, and, of course, the House committee that drafted H.R. 41,
apparently believed the Constitution posed no bar to such patents.
Walterscheid, supra note 65, at 871, 872-73. As the Patent Act of 1790 shows,
however, Congress, as a whole, did not agree and excluded such patents from
the legislation. Walterscheid, supra note 63, at 502-03. Unfortunately, one
can only surmise as to the reasons for the global prior art definitions in those
early acts because no discussions of prior art definitions appear in the relevant
legislative history.
66. Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793 (An Act to Promote the Progress of the
Useful Arts), ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 319 (repealed 1836). The 1793 Act
changed the patent system from one of examination of inventions for
patentability, to one of registration. An applicant could register a claim to an
invention and receive a patent, but the patent could be invalidated on a
showing that the invention did not meet the requirements for patentability
laid down in the Act. Id. The 1836 Patent Act changed the process back to
one of examination of applications, creating the structure for the system we
have today. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 119.
67. See, e.g., Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 14, 24 (1829) (invalidating
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v. Cooper, the Supreme Court invalidated a patent on an
invention that had been in public use in England and France
before the applicant filed for a patent in the United States. The
Court took occasion in the decision to offer the following
comments on the Patent Act of 1793:
The patent law was designed for the public benefit, as well as for the
benefit of inventors. For a valuable invention, the public, on the
inventor's complying with certain conditions, give him, for a limited
period, the profits arising from the sale of the thing invented. This
holds out an inducement for the exercise of genius and skill, in
making discoveries that may be useful to society, and profitable to the
discoverer. But it was not the intention of this law, to take from the
public, that of which they were fairly in possession. In the progress of
society, the range of discoveries.., will be enlarged ..... [I]t would
be extremely impolitic, to retard or embarrass this advance, by
withdrawing from the public any useful invention or art, and making
it a subject of private monopoly. Against this consequence, the
legislature carefully guarded in the laws they have passed on the
subject.6"
Despite this cogent reasoning (or perhaps because of it),
Congress, in 1836, introduced a geographical "in this country"
limitation into U.S. patent law with the following directive:
The Commissioner shall make or cause to be made, an examination of
the alleged new invention or discovery; and if, on any such
examination, it shall not appear to the Commissioner that the same
had been invented or discovered by any other person in this
country.., or that it had been patented or described in any printed
publication in this or any foreign country, or had been in public use or
on sale with the Applicant's consent or allowance prior to the
application ... it shall be his duty to issue a patent therefor. 9
Unfortunately, Congress did not articulate a rationale for
the geographic provision. The Supreme Court, however, offered
this dicta regarding the geographical limitation in the 1850
Gayler v. Wilder decision:
If the foreign invention had been printed or patented, it was already
given to the world and open to the people of this country ... upon
patent on invention that had been in public use for seven years before a patent
application was filed); Mellus v. Silsbee, 16 F. Cas. 1332, 1333 (D. Mass. 1825)
(noting that to obtain a patent "it has been uniformly held, that it must be
shown that the invention is new, not only in the United States, but to the
world, and that it was not in use before the asserted discovery").
68. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292, 320 (1833).
69. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117, 119-20. It has been
speculated that Congress included the geographical limitation in response to
the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292 (1833),
perhaps because such foreign knowledge or use was deemed too remote to be
accessible to the interested American public. See Kadidal, supra note 44, at
385-86.
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reasonable inquiry. They would therefore derive no advantage from
the invention here ... and the inventor therefore is not considered to
be entitled to the reward. But if the foreign discovery is not patented,
nor described in any printed publication, it might be known and used
in remote places for ages, and the people of this country be unable to
profit by it. The means of obtaining [the] knowledge would not be
within their reach.... [Ilt would be the same thing as if the
improvement had never been discovered. It is the inventor here that
brings it to them, and places it in their possession. And as he does
this by the effort of his own genius, the law regards him as the
first.., inventor... although the improvement had in fact been
invented before, and used by others.7"
The Court's explanation is important because it was clearly
talking about prior foreign use that is not accessible, not "open
to the people of this country,"71 in the way foreign patents and
publications were deemed to be accessible. As stated by
Professor Donald Chisum, a noted patent commentator, "the
exclusion of unpublished foreign uses was based on a
convenient presumption of inaccessibility just as the inclusion
of published foreign sources was based on a convenient
presumption of accessibility."72  The Court seemingly
considered the ban on classifying foreign prior knowledge or
use as prior art as a benefit to the people of the United States,
providing them with access to profitable knowledge that they
otherwise would not have had. This reasoning makes sense
only to the extent foreign public knowledge or use was truly
inaccessible to the interested public in 1836, since, as will be
discussed, the Framers did not intend for "progress in useful
arts" to come at the expense of taking information out of the
public domain. 73
Professor Chisum agrees that the perceived inaccessibility
of foreign uses to the U.S. public was a main justification for
the 1836 geographical limitation. 74 He also adds one more: the
avoidance of perceived evidentiary difficulties in proving
foreign use. He notes,
There is no clear statement of the reason for excluding
unpublished foreign uses either in the report accompanying the 1836
Act or in the subsequent codifications. The supposed evidentiary
problems in proving prior foreign uses were undoubtedly influential.
Also accessibility to the public in the United States was probably an
70. Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 497 (1850).
71. Id.
72. Id.; Chisum, supra note 36, at 36.
73. See infra notes 86-99.
74. Chisum, supra note 36, at 36.
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overriding principle.75
The ban on foreign public knowledge or use as prior art
remained in successive patent statutes, and was most recently
codified in § 102 of the Patent Act of 1952, the current Act. 76
Its continued presence in U.S. patent law, however, has been
controversial. In 1966, a Presidential Commission report
recommended to Congress that the geographical limitation in
§ 102 be eliminated, to achieve the following results:
Foreign knowledge, use and sale would be included as prior art.
Present arbitrary geographical distinctions would be eliminated. The
same high standard of proof now required for showing domestic public
knowledge, use or sale would also be applied to such foreign prior art.
The anomaly of excluding, from prior art, public knowledge, use or
sale in a border town of Mexico or Canada, and including the same
kind of disclosure in Alaska or Hawaii, would be eliminated.
This change would prevent the granting of valid U.S. patents on
inventions that would be unpatentable abroad, because of long use or
sale there. It would be another step toward conformity with
European patent laws and would promote acceptance of a common
definition of universal prior art."
As one can tell from looking at § 102, those recommendations
were not adopted and the United States has continued to have
a geographical limitation on foreign public knowledge or use as
prior art.78 A patent reform bill was introduced in both
chambers of Congress in 1967 that would have eliminated the
geographical limitation as proposed by the Commission Report,
but the bill never became law.79 The failure of the bill was
75. Id.
76. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
77. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS,
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, S. DOc.
No. 90-5, at 15 (1967).
78. Note, however, that amendments to § 102(g) in 1999 did remove a
portion of the geographical limitation contained in that subsection by allowing
evidence of prior invention in another country to be used in interference
proceedings to the extent permitted in § 104. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(1).
80. Donald W. Banner, The Recent Proposal to Change the United States
Patent System, 2 PAT. L. REV. 543, 551-52 (1970). See also Hearings on H.R.
5924, H.R. 13951, and Related Bills for the General Revision of the Patent
Laws Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong.
521 (1967) (testimony of Hon. John F. Kincaid, Assistant Secretary for Science
and Technology, Dept. of Commerce) (concluding that "it is premature at the
present time to incorporate this standard into the laws of this country");
William E. Schuyler, Jr., Small Business and the Proposed Patent Reform Act
of 1967, 36 GEO WASH. L. REV. 122, 126 (1967) (arguing that "[bly subjecting
the validity of United States patents to proof of prior public use or sale
2003] PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL
likely due to pressure from the small business lobby and other
interest groups that succeeded in getting the Johnson
administration to conclude that the nation was not yet ready
for such a "universal prior art standard," let alone for the first
to file system and pre-grant patent opposition proceedings that
were also part of the bill.80 Yet the problems identified by the
Presidential Commission have only increased in the years since
publication of the report.
The Enola bean patent dispute provides a stunning
example of the type of problems that might have been avoided
had Congress implemented the changes recommended by the
1966 Presidential Commission's report. In 1994, Larry Proctor,
a Colorado seed company owner, purchased a bag of edible
mixed beans in Sonora, Mexico, brought them back to the
United States, selected out the yellow beans and planted them,
allowing them to self-pollinate until he achieved a uniform
population of yellow beans.81 In 1996, Proctor filed a patent
application in the USPTO on the yellow "Enola" beans, as he
named them.8 2 Three years later, the application issued as a
U.S. patent covering any field bean having a particular yellow
color.83 Proctor then sued a company that was importing
anywhere in the world, the act introduces uncertainties concerning validity
which will persist for the full term of the patent" (citation omitted)).
80. See sources cited supra note 79.
81. U.S. Patent No. 5,894,079, column 2, line 58-column 3, line 50 (issued
Apr. 13, 1999).
82. See U.S. Patent No. 5,894,079 (issued Apr. 13, 1999) (stating that U.S.
Patent Application No. 749,449 was filed Nov. 15, 1996). Mr. Proctor also
applied for and obtained a Plant Variety Protection Certificate from the USDA
for Enola under the Plant Variety Protection Act. "Enola" is the middle name
of Mr. Proctor's wife. Timothy Pratt, Patent on Small Yellow Bean Provokes
Cry of Biopiracy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2001, at F5.
83. U.S. Patent No. 5,894,079 (issued Apr. 13, 1999). Claim 13 of the
patent is for "[seed from a field bean variety of Phaseolus vulgaris that is
completely yellow in color, wherein the yellow color is from about 7.5 Y 8.5/4 to
about 7.5 Y 8.5/6 in the Munsell Book of Color." Proctor's claim to novelty is
that the Enola variety, an "Azufrado-type" bean, is "unique because of its
distinctive yellow color and also because it was not grown previously in the
U.S." RURAL ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION INTERNATIONAL, MEXICAN BEAN
BIOPIRACY 2 (2000), available at http://www.rafi.org/documents/
geno-mexicanbean.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2002)[hereinafter MEXICAN BEAN
BIOPIRACY] (citing personal conversation with Larry Proctor) . Without the §
102(b) geographical limitation on prior art, the fact that the bean was not
previously grown in the United States would be irrelevant as long as it was
grown (and publicly known) anywhere. See infra notes 191-93 (describing the
irrelevance of geographical distinctions under the EPC, which has no provision
similar to § 102).
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yellow Mexican beans into the United States. Using his patent,
Proctor has been able to stop the importation of any beans in
the particular color range claimed in the patent at the U.S.
border, causing significant economic harm to Mexican farmers
and exporters. 84
The importers and several international activist groups
were understandably outraged by both the patent and the
lawsuit, stating that what Mr. Proctor "had given a new name
to and gotten rights over" was a bean that had been eaten for
centuries by Mexicans and other Latin Americans and that had
actually been involved in breeding programs in Mexico. 85
Nevertheless, because of § 102(b)'s geographical limitation
on prior art, if information on the yellow Enola bean were not
in printed form, it might be impossible to invalidate Proctor's
patent, despite the fact that the beans were in "public use"
right across the border from the United States and the public
had access to this knowledge.8 6 This is because even if the
84. Pratt, supra note 82, at F5. According to Miguel Tachna Felix of the
Agricultural Association of Rio Fuerte,
We had been exporting this yellow bean (Mayocaba) and others to
the United States for over four years when [Podners, Proctor's seed
company] received their patent-based on erroneous claims. When
they got the patent they sent a letter to all the importers of Mexican
beans in the United States, warning that this bean was their property
and that if they planned to sell it they would have to pay royalties to
[Podners]. For us, this meant an immediate drop in export sales, over
90%, which affected us tremendously. And it wasn't only one bean
variety, but also others, because it created fear among bean
importers .... Our farmers have suffered great economic losses.
Press Release, Rural Advancement Foundation International, Enola Bean
Patent Challenged, http://www.rafi.org/documents/newsenolabean.pdf (Jan. 5,
2001).
85. Pratt, supra note 84; see also MEXICAN BEAN BIOPIRACY, supra note
83, at 2 ("Beans are the principal source of vegetable protein consumed by
Mexicans .... Yellow 'Azufrado' beans are especially popular in the Northwest
region of Mexico where 98% of surveyed Mexicans eat them.") The importers
counterclaimed that the patent was invalid, and the International Center for
Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), an international plant breeding institute in Cali,
Columbia, filed a request for reexamination of the patent with the USPTO in
December 2000. The USPTO ordered a reexamination of the patent in
February 2001. See Reexamination S.N. 90/005,892 of U.S. Patent No.
5,894,079, request published in Official Gazette, January 16, 2001. See also
Press Release, ETC Group, Yellow Bean Patent Owner Sues 16 Farmers and
Processors in US, at http://www.organicconsumers.org/patent/yellowbean
121801.cfm (Dec. 17, 2001) (generally describing the issue and suggesting that
consumers contact the USPTO to urge reexamination of Proctor's patent).
86. The request for reexamination was supported by evidence from CIAT's
gene bank (the largest collection of beans in the world) that six bean
accessions, or types, in the bank were "substantially identical" to beans
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patented bean is identical to, or an obvious variant of, the bean
Proctor purchased in Mexico, the evidence of those purchased
beans is not admissible prior art in the United States.8 7
Moreover, consumers in countries like Japan, Canada, and
member countries of the EPC can eat these beans imported
from Mexico at a fair price, but in the United States, consumers
are either denied access to the imported Mexican beans and
have access only to Proctor's beans, or have to pay higher prices
because of Proctor's patent monopoly.8 8 Mexican exporters
have also lost a legitimate opportunity to expand the market
claimed in Proctor's patent, so invalidating "published" prior art may exist.
See ETC Group, Press Release, supra note 85, at
http://www.organicconsumers.org/patent/yellowbeanl21801.cfm. Rebecca
Gilliland, owner of Tutulli Produce, one of the Mexican bean importers sued by
Proctor, upon receiving notice of the patent and her company's alleged
infringement, commented "I thought the whole thing was a joke. How are
they going to tell me they invented a bean I've been eating for 40 years?"
Pratt, supra note 84, at F5. Unfortunately, Ms. Gilliland, who started her
bean import business in the early 1990's to supply the Mexican-American
market in the United States with the yellow beans she loved to eat as a child,
and who imported up to six million pounds of them per year, is no longer
importing yellow beans. She stocks eggplant, cucumbers, and roma tomatoes
instead. Sandy Tolan, A Bean of a Different Color, http://www.
americanradioworks.org/features/food-politics/beans/3.html (last visited Oct.
12, 2002).
87. It could, perhaps, be used under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) as evidence that
Proctor was not himself the inventor of the claimed invention. There are no
geographical limitations on the kinds of evidence that can be introduced under
§ 102(f). See 35 U.S.C. §102(f).
88. Proctor's company, Podners, sought royalties of six cents per pound
from importers. MEXICAN BEAN BIOPIRACY, supra note 83, at 2. When
Proctor's attorneys filed forty-three new claims in a reissue application,
however, the USPTO merged the two proceedings, thus delaying resolution of
the issue of the Enola bean patent's validity. See Reissue Application No.
09/773,303; see also Press Release, ETC Group, supra note 85, at
http://www.organicconsumers.org/ patentlyellowbeanl21801.cfm.
Meanwhile, on November 30, 2001, Proctor filed a lawsuit against sixteen
U.S. farmers and processors who he claims are infringing his patent by
growing and selling "his" yellow Enola bean. See id. Podners has licensed the
bean to eight processors and almost 80 growers. Battle Brewing Over Enola
Bean, AG. J. 3 (Dec. 4, 2001), at http://www.agjournal.com/
story.cfm?story-id=1641. According to Bob Brunner, President of Northern
Feed & Bean and one of the defendants in the case: "We were shocked to be
accused of infringing Proctor's intellectual property .... We've been growing
yellow beans from Mexico since 1997 - and they are not Proctor's Enola
beans." Press Release, ETC Group, supra note 85, at http://www.
organicconsumers.org/patent/yellowbeanl2l8Ol.cfm. The 1997 date is of no
help to the defendants because Proctor filed his patent application in 1996.
See supra note 81.
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for their beans to the United States.8 9 This is precisely the
kind of anomaly the 1966 Presidential Commission foresaw in
its recommendation to eliminate geographical distinctions
based on prior art.90
Criticism of the § 102(b) geographical limitation did not
end with the Presidential Commission's report. From time to
time, commentators have made'policy arguments for the
elimination or modification of the geographical limitation on
prior art.91 However, the arguments posed have not addressed
the unconstitutionality of the limitation based on its violation
of the constraints on Congressional power under the
Intellectual Property Clause. Evaluating the limitation in light
of constitutional requirements and policy goals reveals that,
whether or not a geographical limitation on prior art made
sense in 1836, it certainly is an unconstitutional rule now.
II. PRIOR ART AND THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CLAUSE
Section 102(b)'s geographical limitation on foreign public
knowledge or use currently conflicts with the constitutional
objective of providing time-limited exclusive rights to inventors
in order to promote the progress of the useful arts. The nature
of this conflict can be gleaned from an analysis of the purposes
underlying the constraints of the Intellectual Property Clause
and changes in the public accessibility of foreign public
knowledge or use.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
The Intellectual Property Clause is unique among
constitutional provisions in being the only grant of authority to
Congress expressing the precise way in which Congress was to
exercise that authority.92 This unique aspect of the Clause is
89. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
90. S. Doc. NO. 90-5, at 15 (1967).
91. For a sampling of policy arguments against § 102(b)'s geographical
limitation, see Chisum, supra note 36, at 35 (recommending that the foreign-
activity prior art distinctions in § 102 be eliminated); Kadidal, supra note 44,
at 377-78 (same); Bliss, supra note 44, at 67 (same); Fecteau, supra note 43, at
72 (same). For arguments advocating a modification of the § 102(b) limitation,
see William LaMarca, supra note 43, at 52.
92. See In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (C.C.P.A. 1951) ("It is
interesting to note that this particular grant is the only one of the several
powers conferred upon the Congress that is accompanied by a specific
statement of the reason for it."); see also Joseph Story, Commentaries on the
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important because it establishes that the Intellectual Property
Clause is not just an express grant of power, it also contains
limitations on that power. 93 Congress may grant exclusive
rights, but the grants must be for limited times, they must be
to inventors, they must be for discoveries, and they must tend
to promote the progress of useful arts.94  These are
constitutional constraints, and at least one of them, the
requirement that the patent system promote the progress of
useful arts, is violated by the § 102(b) limitation on foreign
public knowledge or use.95
In drafting the Intellectual Property Clause, the Framers
were well aware of both the potential promise and peril of
patents from experience with the English patent system. 96 In
pre- and post-Statute of Monopolies England, exclusive rights,
were granted on staples of trade such as salt, sulfur, metal and
Constitution, in 3 THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION 43-44 (Philip B. Kurland
and Ralph Lerner, eds., 1987) (noting that the Framers initially contemplated
extending the reach of the current Intellectual Property Clause "to establish
public institutions, rewards, and immunities for the promotion of agriculture,
commerce and manufactures" but ultimately abandoned that expansive
proposition); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and
Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of
the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 32 (1994).
93. As noted by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.: "The
[Intellectual Property] [Cilause is both a grant of power and a limitation. This
qualified authority, unlike the power often exercised in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries by the English Crown, is limited to the promotion of
advances in the "useful arts." 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966); see also Merges &
Reynolds supra note 27, at 46 ("[T]here are limits on Congress's power to
create and extend intellectual property interests. Such limits are 'internal' in
the sense that they are the result of the very same constitutional provision
giving rise to Congress's power in the first place, the [Intellectual Property]
Clause of the Constitution .... ).
94. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-6.
95. The limitation may also aid violations of another requirement: that
patents be awarded to true inventors. Although the statutory provision
implementing that requirement, § 102(f), contains no geographical limitation,
the limitation present in § 102(b) may cast a cloud over evidence of foreign
knowledge or use, making it less likely to be invoked for § 102(f) purposes, or
to be decisive in resolving a § 102(f) dispute. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
By "discoveries," the Framers clearly did not mean to include foreign
public knowledge and use since the clause requires a person to be a true
inventor. Additionally, as previously discussed, patents of importation were
believed to be unconstitutional. See sources cited supra note 65.
96. As the Supreme Court further noted in Graham v. John Deere Co., the
Intellectual Property Clause "was written against the backdrop of the
practices-eventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies-of the Crown in
granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses which had long
before been enjoyed by the public." 383 U.S. at 5.
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ore mining, alum, ovens, vinegar, and iron, allowing the holder
to both practice and exclude others from practicing. 97 The idea
that granting limited monopolies to inventors could act as a
spur to innovation was certainly important to the Framers. 98
Their desire to protect the public domain from the abuses
practiced by the English Crown in granting monopolies on old
industries also was a key concern, however, and informed the
nature of the constraints on the patent power.99
Accordingly, the Framers created within the Clause a
balance between two competing needs: "the need to encourage
innovation and the [need to] avoid[] ... monopolies which stifle
competition without any concomitant advance in the 'Progress
of Science and useful Arts."' 00 To comply with this intent,
Congress, from the earliest patent acts, limited the term of a
patent to 14 years, required the applicant to attest to a belief
that she is the first and true inventor of the claimed invention,
and required that an invention be novel (not before known or
used) and useful. 10 1 Congress later made express the implied
requirement that a patentable invention be more than the mere
work of a skilled mechanic, i.e., that it be nonobvious to a
person of ordinary skill in the art.10 2 Requiring novelty and
97. See, e.g., HAROLD G. Fox, MONOPOLIES AND PATENTS 71, 178-84
(1947); William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States, in 3
THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION 43 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987); Heald & Sherry, supra note 26, at 1143. The Statute of Monopolies
voided all such grants but carved out various exceptions such as one allowing
patents for "new manufactures within this realm, to the true and first
inventor and inventors of such manufactures." Statute of Monopolies, 1623,
21 Jam, 1, c. 3, § 6 (Eng.); see also Hearings, supra note 26, at 840;
Walterscheid, supra note 64, at 450. Interestingly, the phrase "true and first
inventor" in the Statute of Monopolies included the first person to import a
new manufacture into the realm. Id. at 840-41. Of course, the statute itself
contained a geographical limitation to "within this realm." Statute of
Monopolies § 6. The founding fathers chose not to adopt this language in
drafting the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution.
98. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 26, at 1149.
99. See id. at 1143; Walterscheid, supra note 92, at 55-56 (discussing the
fairly widespread aversion to monopolies at that time, as evidenced by
requests by the ratifying conventions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
York, and North Carolina, for amendments that made clear Congress could
not grant exclusive monopolies of commerce to merchants).
100. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146
(1989). No records detail any debate about the Clause; it apparently elicited
little controversy and was adopted unanimously. See Walterscheid, supra note
92, at 50-51.
101. See supra note 49.
102. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966); see also Hotchkiss v.
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nonobviousness in patentable inventions was a way of ensuring
that "old" technologies and industries could not be removed
from the public domain by a patent grant.
Evidence that the Framers intended for patented
inventions to be novel over publicly accessible prior art from
anywhere, in any form, comes from the Patent Act of 1790. As
discussed in Part I, the bill that ultimately became the Act of
1790 originally contained a geographical prior use limitation to
"in the United States." That provision was deleted after
debate, and the bill passed without any geographical limitation
on prior art. As noted by the Supreme Court, the fact that the
First Congress rejected a proposal to insert a provision into an
enactment, and the fact that the proposal was made "suggests
its proponents thought it necessary, and the fact that it was
rejected suggests we should give weight to the views of those
who opposed the proposal."10 3 The First Congress considered
including the geographical limitation and rejected the
provision. This is compelling because the Court has spoken, on
a number of occasions, of the importance of actions of the First
Congress as providing "'contemporaneous and weighty
evidence' of the Constitution's meaning since many of the
members of Congress 'had taken part in framing that
instrument.'" 10 4 Thus the § 102 geographical limitation is
Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850).
104. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 521 (2001) (referring to a rejected
proposal at the time of the First Congress to insert a right into the First
Amendment).
105. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1986) (citing Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
674 (1984) (referring to the Court's emphasis that the First Congress "'was a
Congress whose constitutional decisions have always been regarded, as they
should be regarded, as of the greatest weight in the interpretation of that
fundamental instrument"' (citing Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 174-75 (1926))).
The Court's elaboration in Myers v. United States is illustrative:
We have first a construction of the Constitution made by a Congress
which was to provide by legislation for the organization of the
Government in accord with the Constitution which had just then been
adopted, and in which there were, as representatives and senators, a
considerable number of those who had been members of the
Convention that framed the Constitution and presented it for
ratification. It was the Congress that launched the Government.... It
was a Congress whose constitutional decisions have always been
regarded, as they should be regarded, as of the greatest weight in the
interpretation of that fundamental instrument.
Myers, 272 U.S. at 174-75. Accord Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265,
297 (1888) (stating that an Act "passed by the First Congress assembled under
the Constitution, many of whose members had taken part in framing that
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unlike a practice unbroken from the time of Constitutional
enactment, which "is not something to be lightly cast aside."10 5
Rather, it is more like a long-lived aberration, inconsistent with
the intent of the Framers and the strictures inherent in the
Constitutional text.
The novelty requirement, originally unlimited by
geography in the first two patent acts, was limited by the
Patent Act of 1836 to barring inventions, publicly known, used,
or sold in the United States, or described in foreign patents or
printed publications anywhere in the world. 10 6 This distinction
apparently arose, at least in part, from a perception that
foreign knowledge or use was not sufficiently accessible to the
interested public in the United States for it to be deemed to be
in the global public domain. 07  On the other hand, the
description of an invention in a patent or printed publication,
existing anywhere, was deemed to destroy novelty as long as
the reference was accessible to the interested public.'08 While
this dichotomy may have made sense in 1836, in the twenty-
first century, judicial interpretations of "public accessibility",
combined with changes in the accessibility of foreign public
knowledge or use, cause the geographical limitation to violate
the novelty and nonobviousness requirements implicit in the
Intellectual Property Clause.
B. PUBLIC ACCESSIBILITY
If the Constitution requires patentable inventions to be
novel and nonobvious over what is "available" to the public,
there must be criteria to define what information can be
considered in that analysis. Consistent with the statutes that
preceded it, § 102(b) places no geographical limitation on prior
art if it is in the form of a patent or a printed publication. 0 9 In
terms of what constitutes a "printed publication," the phrase
"has been interpreted to give effect to ongoing advances in the
technologies of data storage, retrieval, and dissemination." 10
instrument, . . . is contemporaneous and weighty evidence of its true
meaning"); Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 463-64 (1884).
108. Walz v. Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).
106. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, 119.
107. See Chisum, supra note 36, at 36.
108. See Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 497 ( 1850).
109. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). As noted previously, the same analysis
applies for § 102(a). See supra note 60.
110. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Changing the reading
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Consequently, information on microfilm, videotape, or even the
Internet can be a "printed publication" within the meaning of §
102(b) if it meets the key requirement of public accessibility.III
Printed publications are prior art if they are publicly accessible.
As noted by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC): "Because there are many ways in which a reference
may be disseminated to the interested public, 'public
accessibility' has been called the touchstone in determining
whether a reference constitutes a 'printed publication' bar
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)."" 12
Just what level of public accessibility is required for a
printed publication to qualify as prior art? Apparently, the bar
is quite low. In In re Hall, the CAFC held that a single copy of
a doctoral thesis, in German, indexed and listed in a card
catalogue in a German library at the edge of the Black Forest,
and only available there, is prior art here in the United States,
despite the difficulty of access or improbability of knowing that
the thesis existed. 1 3 The court made its position quite clear:
"[W]e reject appellant's legal argument that a single cataloged
thesis in one university library does not constitute sufficient
accessibility to those interested in the art exercising reasonable
diligence."' 14
The rule regarding the meaning of "patented" in § 102(b) is
similar. Information is "patented" within the meaning of §
102(b) if it is "available to the public" and the rights granted
are both "substantial and exclusive." 1 5 Thus, a German design
patent, or Geschmackmuster, available for viewing only by
traveling to the particular city courthouse in Germany where
of "printed publication" to give it an expanded meaning reflecting the
relevance of new technologies is consistent with Professor Lessig's theory
regarding changed readings of the Constitution: "What the lawyer or court
does is find a reading of a legal text in a new context, so as to preserve the
meaning of an earlier reading of the legal text in an earlier context." Lessig,
Changed Readings, supra note 29, at 402 (emphasis omitted).
111. Hall, 781 F.2d at 899.
112. Id. at 898-99.
113. Id. at 900; see also Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v. Banner, 778 F.2d
775, 783 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (denying a patent of a compound since it was
represented by a point on a graph in a Russian article). But see In re Cronyn,
890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that student theses that were
neither catalogued or indexed in a meaningful way were not accessible to the
public and thus not printed publications). Thus prior art, as a practical
matter, includes much information that the public cannot easily find.
114. Hall, 781 F. 2d at 900.
115. In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1035-37 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
20031
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the registered design is deposited, is prior art under § 102.116
The reasoning employed by the CAFC in reaching this
conclusion is telling:
We recognize that Geschmacksmuster on display for public view
in remote cities in a far-away land may create a burden of discovery
for one without the time, desire, or resources to journey there in
person or by agent to observe that which was registered and protected
under German law. Such a burden, however, is by law imposed upon
the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art who is charged
with knowledge of all the contents of the relevant prior art. " I7
Thus, for both patents and printed publications, the § 102
requirements of public accessibility and public availability have
been broadly construed in the context of foreign art despite the
burden such a requirement may impose on patent applicants.
Furthermore, even the § 102(b) concept of "public use"118 in
this country, another category of relevant prior art, has been
interpreted expansively. In Baxter International, Inc. v. Cobe
Laboratories, Inc., use of a novel centrifuge in a private
laboratory in a National Institutes of Health (NIH) building
was deemed a prior art "public use" under § 102(b). 119 The
court reasoned from the policies underlying the public use bar
116. Id. at 1037.
117. Id. A general written description of the design, location of the model
available for viewing, and other particulars was provided in the German
Federal Gazette, or Bundesanzeiger. See id. The court asserted that this
entry "alert[s] the public to potentially relevant designs and directs the
notified reader to proceed to Coburg to obtain the actual design." Id.
118. Although the word "public" does not appear in § 102(a), it has been
judicially determined that only "public" knowledge or use are barred by the
statute. See, e.g., Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135,
139 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("The statutory language "known or used by others in this
country". . ., means knowledge or use which is accessible to the public."); W.L.
Gore & Assoc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding
claims invalid under section 102(a) for public use of the invention before the
asserted invention date); see also 3M Unitek Corp. v. Ormco Co., 96 F. Supp.
2d 1042, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2000). The Ormco court stated,
Under § 102(a) prior art anticipates the patented invention where the
prior art is "known or used by others" prior to the date of
invention.... This phrase necessitates a finding that the public must
have access to the knowledge of the prior art .... Generally, any "non-
secret use" of the process or invention "in its natural and intended
way is public use.".. .Furthermore, a court may find public use where
there is non-secret use of a claimed process in the usual course of
producing articles for commercial use.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Consequently, the analysis for
public use under § 102(b) is also relevant to the analysis for "known or used"
in § 102(a).
119. 88 F.3d 1054, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL
that because there was no control over the invention by the
inventor, and because the laboratory was in a public building,
anyone "who saw the centrifuge in operation would have
reasonably believed [it] was publicly available."120 Judge
Newman, in dissent, commented on the breadth of this ruling,
noting that "[t]his new category of internal laboratory use is
immune to the most painstaking documentary search." 121
The public accessibility standard enunciated in these
decisions seems to be one of "constructive" accessibility, and is
determined on a case-by-case basis. 22 Under this standard, the
only types of information that should not qualify as prior art
would be secret information or information unavailable because
of a political or other extraordinary barrier.123 For example, if
a country did not allow U.S. citizens to enter its borders freely,
then public knowledge or use in that country might be
considered not publicly accessible. 124
The reasoning behind these expansive judicial
constructions is simple. The Constitution prohibits Congress
from granting exclusive patent rights over subject matter in the
public domain: "Congress in the exercise of the patent power
may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated
constitutional purpose.... Moreover, Congress may not
authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove
existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free
access to materials already available."125 The prohibition is
120. Id. at 1058.
121. Id. at 1062 (Newman, J. dissenting).
122. See id. at 1058 ("In considering whether a particular use was a public
use within the meaning of § 102(b), we consider the totality of the
circumstances in conjunction with the policies underlying the public use bar.").
123. Information maintained as a trade secret is not considered
invalidating prior art except as to the trade secret owner who tries to patent it
after benefiting from it for more than the one-year grace period provided by §
102(b). W.L. Gore & Assoc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (noting that
commercialization of tape produced by a secret process for more than one year
before filing a patent application would forfeit the applicant's patent rights).
Other examples of secret information are shaman or tribal healer secrets, or
the traditional knowledge of an indigenous group that is not shared with
outsiders.
124. See Badowski v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 252, 255-56 (Ct. Cl. 1958)
(finding Russian document obtained only with difficulty through diplomatic
channels not available as prior art). But see In re Ward, 236 F.2d 428, 430-31
(C.C.P.A. 1956) (affirming the availability as a prior art reference of a Swiss
patent even though the reference was unavailable to U.S. residents due to
Switzerland's being surrounded by the enemy during WWII).
125. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). See also Aronson v.
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particularly applicable to § 102(b) because "[t]he novelty and
nonobviousness requirements express a congressional
determination that the purposes behind the [Intellectual
Property] Clause are best served by free competition and
exploitation of either that which is already available to the
public or that which may be readily discerned from publicly
available material."126
Congress's wisdom in making foreign patents and printed
publications prior art from the earliest patent act, when they
were surely difficult for inventors and other interested persons
to obtain, is clearly evident today. Inventors (and the general
public) now have fingertip access to millions of foreign patents
and printed publications through the Internet and commercial
databases, as well as easy access by mail, library, and even
cheap international travel opportunities. 27 Thus, Congress's
"hard" decision for inventors in 1790 was consistent with the
constitutional directive to promote progress of the useful arts
by not awarding patents for old inventions.128 Today, a similar
hard decision is required now that foreign public knowledge or
use is "publicly accessible."
C. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND "NEW LIBRARIES"
In exploring the constitutionality of a statute or decision, it
is appropriate to consider changes in factual circumstances in
addition to indications of the original intent of the
Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) ("[T]he stringent
requirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the public
domain remain there for the free use of the public." (discussing Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bieron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974))).
126. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150
(1989).
127. See, e.g., www.micropatent.com (last visited Oct. 4, 2002), www.
patenthunter.com (last visited Oct. 4, 2002), www.uspto.gov/patents/ (last
visited Oct. 4, 2002), www.orbitz.com (last visited Oct. 4, 2002),
www.expedia.com (last visited Oct. 4, 2002), www.skyauction.com (last visited
Oct. 4, 2002).
128. In fact, the decision was likely not very difficult for inventors in 1790
since the three person U.S. Patent Board, composed of the Secretary of State
(at that time Thomas Jefferson), the Secretary for the Department of War, and
the Attorney General, was unable, and probably uninclined, to make any
extensive search of foreign art. Nevertheless, the rule was established, even if
the implementation was weak. See Michael D. Davis, The Patenting of
Products of Nature, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 293, 300 (1995)
(noting "neither Jefferson nor the Patent Commission had the time to deal
with the daily rigors of patent examination").
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Constitution's Framers. 129 The world has grown considerably
smaller since the passage of the 1836 Patent Act with its
geographical limitation on prior art. The development of
technology enabling global travel and information transfer at
increasing rates of speed have played a role in creating the
global village in which we now live. 130
As long ago as 1960, the District Court for the District of
Columbia noted the impact changes in the world might have on
the need for a geographical limitation on prior art:
No doubt the present rule originated in the days when the only means
of travel between continents was by sailing ships, and the sole means
of communication was by slow mail. Conceivably, under those
conditions, an invention made abroad might have never become
known in the United States. Today, with modern means of travel and
communication, information may be transmitted from Europe to the
United States as rapidly as from the eastern seaboard to Honolulu
and Alaska. With the great increase in the volume of travel between
countries, as well as the constant utilization of new means of
communication, it might well be argued that the reason for the rule
no longer exists. 3 '
129. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 862-64 (1992);
Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 23 (2001)
(discussing "changed facts" as the "fourth stare decisis factor" in the Casey
Court's discussion, the other factors being workability, reliance, and remnant
of abandoned doctrine); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare
Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and
Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1562 (2000) (same). Technically, stare decisis is
not implicated in elimination of the geographical limitation because the
Supreme Court has not relied on the geographical limitation in any of its
holdings, it has only been mentioned in dicta. See supra note 34 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, factors that are useful in determining
whether stare decisis is appropriate should also inform the Court's statutory
analysis when conflict with binding precedent is not at issue.
130. See Mark, supra note 3, at 1181 ("The dynamic ongoing process of
globalization involves 'the inexorable integration of markets, nation states and
technologies to a degree never witnessed before-in a way that is enabling
individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around the world farther,
faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before."' (citing THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE
LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 9 (Revised ed. 2000))).
Statistics indicate that between 1945 and 1999, the number of revenue
passenger miles flown on domestic and international flights increased from
450 million to 651.6 billion. Compare BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES
TO 1970, at 77 tbl. Q577-Q590 (1976) with BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2001, at 667,
tbl.1057 (2001) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. A similar analysis was
made in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 309 n.13
(1980) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
131. Monaco v. Hoffman, 189 F. Supp. 474, 482 (D.D.C. 1960) (deciding
case under the "in this country" limitation of 35 U.S.C. § 199 of the Patent
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This changing landscape is also evident in the practices of
multinational corporations, which have an established presence
in multiple geographic regions of the world. 132  These
companies are well positioned to access knowledge or use in the
foreign countries where they operate. 133
For example, over the past few decades the
pharmaceutical industry has enormously increased research-
related travel and ethnobiological research of indigenous
groups. 134  Ethnobiological research refers to studying the
knowledge of "indigenous peoples about the utility, diversity
and chemical characteristics of plants found in their
environment." 135 In 1989, the worldwide market value for
Act), affd 293 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1961). The court concluded, however, that
"Congress alone may afford the remedy" because "patent law is entirely
statutory." Id. Of course, if the statute is unconstitutional, Congress is not
the only body with authority to remedy the situation.
132. Between 1990 and 1999 alone, U.S. direct investment abroad
increased from over $430 billion to over $1.1 trillion. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT,
supra note at 130, at 794, tbl. 1291. United States direct investment abroad is
"the ownership or control by one U.S. person of 10% or more of the voting
securities of an incorporated foreign business enterprise or an equivalent
interest in an unincorporated foreign business enterprise." Id. Likewise,
between 1990 and 1998, foreign direct investment in the United States
increased from $552.9 billion to $922.9 billion. Id. at tbl. 1288. W.R. Grace is
a prime example of such a multinational corporation. See supra notes 3-13
and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Sealectro Corp. v. L.V.C. Indus., 271 F. Supp. 835, 838
(E.D.N.Y. 1967) (finding that employees of multinational company jointly
made invention, while one inventor was in Great Britain and the other was in
the United States). Today such joint invention situations are common.
134. See, e.g., Anthony Faiola, supra note 30, at A21 (discussing efforts by
the Brazilian government to get countries to ratify the Convention on
Biological Diversity to prevent biopiracy); William K. Stevens, Shamans and
Scientists Seek Cures in Plants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1992, at C1 (detailing the
processes scientists use to find drugs in the rainforest).
135. Yano, Ethnobiological Knowledge, supra note 43, at 443 n.1. Patents
derived from ethnobiological research may be especially problematic as they
are more likely to involve issues of invention derivation, in whole or in part.
Under § 102(f) a person is not entitled to a patent if he did not himself invent
the claimed subject matter. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2000). Section 102(f) is a
modern day incarnation of the prohibition against patents of importation,
which prevented rewarding an applicant for going to another country and
bringing back to the United States new technology that had been invented by
someone else. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. While § 102(f), alone
or in combination with § 103, provides an independent, geographically neutral
basis for denying patent protection to a claimed invention, derivation may be
difficult to establish where a particular claim limitation can only be
established by evidence of prior foreign knowledge or use. See also Hedgewick
v. Akers, 497 F.2d 905, 907 (C.C.P.A. 1974) ("[Elvidence of activity, knowledge
or use concerning an invention in a foreign country is not precluded ... in
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drugs derived from medicinal plant knowledge of indigenous
peoples was approximately $43 billion. 136 Another study found
that 57% of the top 150 prescription drugs contained at least
one major active compound now or at one time derived from
biological sources. 137 Also, in a different survey of 119 known
useful plant-derived drugs, 74% had "the same or related use
as the plants from which they were derived."138 In other words,
indigenous groups were using the plants from which the drug
was derived to cure the same ailments for which the patented
drug is now being prescribed.
In a related development, the past decade has witnessed
the formation of several bioprospector contracts between
developing countries and transnational corporations.
Examples include agreements between the pharmaceutical
giant Merck and the Costa Rican government; 139 Bristol-Myers
establishing derivation .... in a case where an applicant for a patent ... is
trying to show that the adverse party was not an inventor at all but derived
the invention from him, the fact that the events took place in a foreign country
would be immaterial." (citations omitted)).
136. Darrell Posey, Intellectual Property Rights: And Just Compensation
for Indigenous Knowledge, ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY, 13, 15 (Aug. 1990).
137. Glen M. Wiser & David R. Downes, Comments on Improving
Identification of Prior Art: Recommendations on Traditional Knowledge
Relating to Biological Diversity, Center for International Environmental Law,
at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/IdentificationofPriorArt.pdf (last modified
Aug. 2, 1999); see also Yano, Ethnobiological Knowledge, supra note 43, at 450
n.29. Yano notes,
[E]xamples of beneficial drugs that have recently been discovered
by reliance on the native use of plants include: artemisinin, a
sesquiterpene oxide isolated after intensive study of traditional
medicine in China; ... the postherpetic neuralgia treatment capsaicin
derived from peppers; ... the hormone in the first birth control pills
derived from wild yams; ... the hypertension treatment reserpine
derived from herbs; ... the muscle relaxant d-tubocurarine, derived
from the Amazonian indian poison curare;.., the antiarrhythmic
drug quinidine, derived from Cinchona tree bark; ... the emetic drug
emetine, derived from the roots of a plant used by indigenous people
of Brazil to treat dysentery; ... a compound that shows promise of
reducing cholesterol; ... a drug that shows promise of attacking lung
and ovarian cancers found using a 2500-year-old Sanskrit text;...
the glaucoma treatment from the jaburandi plant.
Id. (citations omitted).
138. Norman R. Farnsworth, Screening Plants for New Medicines, in
BIODIvERsITY 83, 95 (E.O. Wilson ed., 1988).
139. McManis, supra note 3, at 270.; Stevens, supra note 134, at C1. Not
all of these relationships have proven successful, however. An agreement
between the University of Georgia and Mexico's Chiapas Indians, funded by a
$2.5 million dollar NIH grant ended abruptly based on fears by some Chiapas
groups that their plants would be patented and their culture and knowledge
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Squibb and the governments of Suriname and Costa Rica; 140 an
agreement between Shaman Pharmaceuticals and the
Aguaruna Indians of Peru;141 the launching of a biodiversity
research program in Micronesia by Japan; and NIH sponsored
initiatives between Monsanto and the Cayetano Peruvian
University to study plants from the Andean rain forest. 142 The
money invested in such ventures by these companies may be a
fairly insignificant portion of their total research and
development budget, but that is consistent with a view of
ethnobiological research as simply another "library" in which
researchers can explore leads for new inventions. 143
The changes in research patterns represented by these
statistics and agreements implicate a basic concept in patent
exploited by the agreement. Global Exchange, Mexican Indians Attack
Biopiracy, at http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/mexico/news/
uventures.html (last modified Feb. 7, 2001).
140. McManis, supra note 3, at 272.
141. Id. at 275.
142. Id. at 270; Stevens, supra note 134, at C1.
143. Merck agreed to pay $1 million plus royalties on resulting commercial
products for a two-year, renewable research program that would provide the
company with chemical extracts from wild plants, insects and microorganisms.
See McManis, supra note 3, at 270 (citing John Vidal, The Gene Rush,
TORONTO STAR, Jul. 10, 1993, at D4). By 1999, Merck had invested $3.5
million in bioprospecting. See Bioprospecting: Exploring Nature's Pharmacy-
or Raiding It?, at www.imshealth.com/public/structure/dispcontent/
1,2779,1037-143402,00.html, (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) (discussing Costa
Ricas' National Biodiversity Institute (InBio) agreement in which InBio, in
exchange for the $3.5. billion Merck investment in bioprospecting, agreed to
share half of its share of royalties with the Costa Rican government for
conservation purposes). Apparently, the agreement has not yielded the
expected results. Sylvia Rodriguez, Bioprospecting Has Failed-What Next?
SEEDLING, 3 (Oct. 2002), at htttp://www.grain.org/seedling/seed-02-10-7-
en.cfm (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) ("Ten years on in the Merck-InBio
agreement, there have been no pharmaceutical 'hits' and therefore no
royalties"). However, other agreements have met with significant success and
new agreements are still being created. See Missouri Botanical Gardens,
Bioprospecting-The Search for New Pharmaceutical, Agricultural, and
Nutritional Products, at http://www.mobot.orgfMOBOT/research/applied-
research/bioprospecting.shtml (last visited Nov. 14, 2002) (discussing the
success of bioprospecting agreements between the Missouri Botanical Gardens
(MBG), Sequoia Sciences and Gabon; MGB, the National Cancer Institute
(NCI) and a research center in Madagascar; and between MGB, Virginia
Polytechnic University, Bristol-Myers Squibb and two organizations in
Suriname). MBG has one of the most active bioprospecting agendas in the
world, having collected over 40,000 plant samples since 1986. Id. Several
bioactive compounds have been isolated from these samples as part of the NCI
agreement and show promise in anti-HIV and other treatments. Id.
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law: "Libraries before laboratories." 144  In other words,
inventors are encouraged to seek out knowledge of the
pertinent art instead of reinventing the wheel in their
laboratories.' 45 There is, of course, no requirement that an
inventor make a search of the prior art before beginning
inventive activity or filing a patent application, but if her
invention is disclosed in the prior art, no patent will be
forthcoming and the time and resources invested in the project
(with expectations of monopoly profits at the end) may be lost.
The definition of "library" has evolved over at least the past
several decades, so that researchers now know to search out
indigenous groups, for example, to find out about medicinal
plants and traditional treatments that may yield patentable
advances. 146 Recognizing that foreign public knowledge or use
is included in the concept of "library" requires eliminating the
§ 102(b) geographical limitation, because such information is as
publicly accessible as geographically unlimited documentary
evidence and evidence of public knowledge, use, and sale in the
United States.
In the spirit of pragmatism, it must be noted that, for some
144. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., A TEACHER'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY
CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 117 (1998) ("Through its prior art
definitions, the patent law arguably encourages technological actors to embark
upon a search for existing technologies before embarking on their own
inventive efforts.").
145. See Chisum, supra note 36, at 35. Chisum states,
[A] basic policy consideration [is] the encouragement of broad and
thorough searches of all secondary sources for a solution to a
technical problem prior to engaging in primary innovative work,
which is generally more costly. This is the same policy consideration
which supports the use of any publication or patent as prior art,
however old and whether or not in fact known to practitioners with
ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
Id.
146. More than twenty years ago, Professor Chisum suggested that
"[dlomestic practitioners faced with technological problems should be
encouraged to study foreign solutions." Id. at 37. Apparently, many people
have taken his advice. According to Mr. Yano, "More drugs should be
forthcoming as more ethnopharmaceutical information is developed. During
the last 50 years, as ethnopharmacological information has begun to appear,
the data has been scattered throughout a diverse literature making it difficult
to gather .... However, efforts are being made to compile the information."
Yano, supra note 43, at 450 n.2 (citing RICHARD E. SCHULTES & REOBER F.
RAFFAUT, THE HEALING FOREST 9 (Theodore R. Dudley ed., 1990)) and their
ethnobotanical study that "identified 1516 plants with medicinal uses during
approximately 30 years of research in the northwest Amazon, [and] recognized
that this was only a limited part of the ethnopharmacological wealth of the
indigenous peoples in the area"). Id.
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people at least, the § 102 geographical limitation does serve a
useful purpose: The limitation benefits anyone whose main
market is the United States. 147 It is therefore not surprising
that interest groups have at times lobbied to keep the
limitation in place. 148 Also, while there is likely a monopoly-
pricing disadvantage to U.S. consumers relative to consumers
in countries without such a limitation, it is possible that some
very useful products, e.g., some pharmaceuticals, would not be
available to the U.S. market as quickly, absent the incentive
the patent system provides to appropriate foreign public
knowledge or use, particularly indigenous knowledge and
genetic resources. 149 Section 102(b) enables this result because
the potentially invalidating foreign knowledge or use, while
publicly accessible from a patent jurisprudence standpoint,
may not be available to consumers in the form of a product for
purchase in the United States. 150
The critical fact is that any novelty or nonobviousness
limitation on patentability, including the traditional limitations
relating to patents and printed publications, prevents an entity
from patenting public domain information. The Framers had
good reasons for denying monopoly protection to such
information and there is no legitimate reason any longer for
treating foreign public knowledge or use differently from
foreign patents, printed publications, and public use in the
147. Because foreign public knowledge or use is not patentable in
European countries, Japan, Canada, and many other major market countries,
the geographical limitation, by allowing the patenting of such information in
the United States., benefits anyone whose main market is the United States.
The limitation allows them to gain exclusive rights over something that could
be competitively available in many other countries. See supra notes 3-17 and
accompanying text (discussing the neem tree controversy).
148. See Schuyler, supra note 79, at 126.
149. However, as noted by one commentator,
We can dismiss outright the nineteenth-century fears, cited
frequently in the years since, that ... such a broad definition of prior
art will mean that many foreign inventions will never reach the U.S.,
now the world's largest consumer market. In a worldwide free trade
system, open ports assure that products will benefit U.S. consumers
even without 'introduction' of the manufacturing processes. In fact,
today the majority of United States patents are issued to foreign
inventors; accused American infringers of these United States
patents, unable to cite to many types of foreign prior activity,
ironically have less prior art to defend themselves with.
Kadidal, supra note 44, at 397 (citation omitted).
150. For example, before the early 1990's there was no significant
importation of Mexican yellow beans, although they were known and used in
Mexico for centuries. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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United States.
Importantly, eliminating the § 102(b) geographical
limitation will not prevent foreign public knowledge or use from
being used in the invention process. Rather, eliminating the
limitation will simply mean that the invention that is
ultimately patented must be novel and nonobvious in view of
that foreign prior art. Pharmaceutical companies, for example,
can still deliver new drugs based on traditional knowledge and
genetic resources to U.S. citizens as long as the advance over
the known art is truly novel and nonobvious, and thus worthy
of protection. 151
Congress and the courts must recognize that foreign public
knowledge or use is as much a part of the global public domain
as are foreign patents, printed publications, and public use in
151. Under current U.S. law a purified naturally occurring compound that
does not exist in nature in the purified or synthesized form can be patented
even if the process for isolating and purifying it is obvious. See, e.g., In re
Krantz, 592 F.2d 1169, 1175 (C.C.P.A. 1979); Parke-Davis v. E.K. Mulford Co.,
189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), affd in part, reversed in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir.
1913). But see In re Burt, 356 F.2d 115, 119 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (noting that the
manner of making a compound may be relevant in determining the
obviousness of the compound); Davis, supra note 128, at 316 n.148 (citing
JAMES E. BAILEY & DAVID F. OLLIS, BIOCHEMICAL ENGINEERING
FUNDAMENTALS 340-41 (2d ed. 1983) for the proposition that modifications of
human proteins which previously seemed impossible to perform, are now
considered relatively trivial exercises). The judicial decisions that enable this
result are controversial, and may provide too low a patentability standard for
inventions. This is the law, for now, however, and a critique of its merits is
beyond the scope of this Article.
Further, overprotecting pharmaceutical inventors, by not holding them to
the same novelty and nonobviousness standards as other inventors, conflicts
with the policy of ensuring low cost access to medicines. Overprotection is
problematic for other reasons as well. As outlined by Professor Maureen
O'Rourke,
[Plolicymakers should concentrate on preventing over rather than
underprotection. While some information likely does suffer from less
than the optimal level of exclusive rights under the public law, the
industries affected by errors in this direction seem quite capable of
correcting the problem, either through the legislative process or the
mechanism of private contract. [citing electronic media and biotech
industry examples] . .. In contrast, the diffuse public that primarily
bears the costs of overprotection may be unable to overcome collective
action problems to form a coalition to argue for correcting such errors.
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1184 n.17 (2000). This collective action problem is
likely to be particularly acute in the area of foreign knowledge or use. This is
because affected parties such as foreign traditional knowledge holders or
foreign goods importers will likely have more difficulty forming a coalition in
another country (the United States) and maneuvering through the U.S.
judicial and legislative systems.
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private government laboratories in the United States 52 All of
these types of evidence are "publicly accessible" information
and thus must serve, consistent with the strictures of the
Intellectual Property Clause, as patent-defeating prior art. It
is time now to remove the geographical limitation that excludes
foreign public knowledge or use from prior art, creating a
boundary where none should exist.
While the above discussion explored the constitutional
deficiency of the geographical limitation, a counterpoint
militating in favor of constitutionality is, most simply, the
advanced age of the provision. As noted by Professors Heald
and Sherry, the Supreme Court has on occasion cited the
existence of early or longstanding congressional action as
evidence of the constitutionality of the action. 53  The
geographical limitation on prior art has been in U.S. law, in one
form or another, since 1836; Congress and the Supreme Court
are aware of it; Congress codified it in the 1952 Patent Act and
it has been mentioned in various Court decisions. 154 Moreover,
it was allowed to remain in U.S. patent law when other
geographical limitations were removed in 1993 and 1996 due to
passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS), respectively. 155 Yet to keep a
152. See, e.g., Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Cobe Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (holding that use of an invention in an NIH government laboratory
was a public use); In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1035-37 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(finding a German Geschmacksmuster registration as relevant prior art in an
obviousness analysis); In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899-900 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(holding a dissertation available in only one German university raised a
"prima facie case of unpatentability" under § 102 (b)).
153. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 26, at 1137 n.139, and cases cited
therein.
154. As noted earlier, the mention of geographic limitation by the Court
has generally merely been as part of the recitation of a subsection of 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 that the Court was called upon to address. See, e.g., Pfaffv. Wells Elec.,
Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 57 (1998); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989); Gandy v. Main Belting Co., 143 U.S. 587, 593 (1892);
Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 497 (1850).
155. 35 U.S.C. § 104 (2000). As amended, § 104 now allows inventors in
NAFTA and WTO countries to prove an earlier date of invention in a foreign
country for U.S. patent applications. See also North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057-2225 (1993),
codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3301-3473 (2000); 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 (2001); General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The
Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33
I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
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bad rule for no better reason than that it has been around since
the time of Andrew Jackson, to paraphrase a well-known
quote,' 56 is not much of a reason at all.
Furthermore, the § 102(b) geographical limitation, while
now unconstitutional, probably did not start out that way, but
became unconstitutional over time.157 Such an occurrence is
not without precedent in constitutional law. Take, for example,
Taylor v. Louisiana, where the Court held that the exclusion of
women from juries is a violation of a criminal defendant's
rights under the Sixth Amendment. 158 Also, the Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence asserting that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society," is a tacit acknowledgement of the need, in
some cases, to depart from long held interpretational
156. See Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 469
(1897) ("It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from blind imitation of the past."); see also Kadidal, supra note 44, at
402-03 ("While a certain degree of reverence for provisions that have escaped
revision since 1836 may be in order, there is no time like the present to change
them.").
157. For other examples of statutes or practices of long duration ultimately
deemed unconstitutional by the Court, see, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S.
3, 21-22 (1997) ("Although the rule of Albrecht [holding that vertical maximum
price fixing was illegal] has been in effect for some time, the inquiry we must
undertake requires considering 'the effect of the antitrust laws ... in the
American economy today.... Now that we confront Albrecht directly, we find
its conceptual foundations gravely weakened."(citations omitted)); Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) ("[Tlraditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice' can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient
forms that are no longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures that
are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage."); Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490-91, 495 (1954) (rejecting the fifty-eight
year-old "separate but equal" doctrine and concluding that mandated
segregated schooling was inherently unequal in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.).
158. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 532-36 (1975). In tracing the
history of the exclusion of women from juries, the Court noted,
[W]e think it is no longer tenable to hold that women as a class may
be excluded ... based solely on sex .... If it was ever the case that
women were unqualified to sit on juries or were so situated that none
of them should be required to perform jury service, that time has long
since passed.... Communities differ at different times and places.
What is a fair cross section at one time or place is not necessarily a
fair cross section at another time or a different place.
Id. at 537 (emphasis added).
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traditions.159  Likewise, in patent law, the time when a
geographical prior art limitation may have been constitutional
has long since passed.
Patent law is a discipline where changes in technology
force the consideration of changes in the law. The Supreme
Court's decision in J.E.M. Agricultural Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer
Hi-Bred International, Inc., confirming that sexually
reproducible plants are patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101, implicitly recognizes that changes in technology
and the world can void longheld assumptions in this area. 160
Refuting the argument that sexually reproducible plants were
not eligible for utility patent protection because they were not
covered by the utility patent statute prior to 1930 (when the
Plant Patent Act was passed), the Court stated,
[I]n 1930 Congress believed that plants were not patentable under §
101, both because they were living things and because in practice
they could not meet the stringent description requirement. Yet these
premises were disproved over time .... '[Tihe relevant distinction'...
is not between 'living and inanimate things, but between products of
nature.., and human-made inventions.'. . . [A]dvances in biological
knowledge and breeding expertise have allowed plant breeders to
satisfy § 101's demanding description requirement....
Petitioners essentially ask us to deny utility patent protection for
sexually reproduced plants because it was unforeseen in 1930 that
such plants could receive protection under § 101. Denying patent
protection ... simply because such coverage was thought
technologically infeasible in 1930, however, would be inconsistent
with the forward-looking perspective of the utility patent statute.
161
This same reasoning applies to the § 102(b) geographical
limitation. It is possible that at the time of the 1836 Patent Act
the geographical limitation was not unconstitutional because
foreign knowledge or use as a category may have been more
akin to the uncataloged student theses in shoeboxes in In re
Cronyn162 than to the indexed, cataloged thesis in In re Hall.1 63
In any event, even if accessing foreign public knowledge or use
of an invention may have been infeasible in 1836, no current
justification exists to continue excluding it from the definition
159. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see also Abramowicz, supra
note 129, at 23-26 (discussing the theory that perceptions of constitutional
law, which may evolve over time, affect constitutional meaning).
160. J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 593,
600 (2001).
161. Id. (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980)).
162. In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
163. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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of prior art. 164
Arguably, foreign public knowledge or use is today, and
probably has been for quite some time, as accessible "to the
public interested in the art"165 as printed publications were in
1836.166 Moreover, the evidentiary concerns regarding "proving
and verifying foreign acts" that justified the geographical
limitation in 1836 are of little consequence in this age of
multinational litigation. 167 Both the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the rules of the USPTO provide for the taking of
testimony in a foreign country for use in a U.S. proceeding. 168
The U.S. courts have also given foreign patent judgments and
findings of fact preclusive effect in some cases. 169
What is more, arguments regarding the evidentiary
difficulties associated with proving and verifying foreign use
and inventive acts were vociferously pressed by opponents to
U.S. modification of 35 U.S.C. § 104 to comply with NAFTA and
TRIPS almost a decade ago. 170 Despite those protests, § 104
was amended to allow U.S. patent applicants to prove a date of
invention in a foreign country earlier than their effective filing
date using foreign evidence. 171 The "significant difficulties" for
American inventors that such commentators suggested would
attend the amendment 72 never materialized, suggesting that
164. See Walterscheid, supra note 65, at 877 (noting difficulty of obtaining
specifications of English patents).
165. Hall, 781 F.2d at 899.
166. See Walterscheid, supra note 65, at 877 n.77. Walterscheid notes,
In principle at least, English specifications could be obtained
during the term of the patent, but this was easier said than done.
They were not published, and were enrolled randomly in any of three
separate offices. It was necessary to know the name of the patentee
in order to have a search conducted .... There was no mechanism for
searching by topic or technology, although a caveat could be entered.
. . permitting one to be informed of the existence of patent
applications involving a particular topic.
167. See Chisum, supra note 36, at 31.
168. FED R. CIV. P. 28(b); 37 C.F.R. § 1.671 (2002).
169. See, e.g., Cochran Consulting v. Uwatec, 102 F.3d 1224, 1229 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (applying preclusion to a Swiss court's decision on ownership of
ROM code); Oneac Corp. v. Raychem Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1242-45 (N.D.
Ill. 1998) (giving preclusive effect to findings of fact decided in a United
Kingdom litigation involving related patents); Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc.
v. Glaverbel, 986 F. Supp. 471, 479 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (giving preclusive effect to
findings of fact decided in a Belgian litigation involving related patents), affd,
178 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
170. See LaMarca, supra note 43, at 52 .
171. 35 U.S.C. § 104 (2000).
172. See Robert A. Armitage, The Uruguay Round & IP: Great or
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eliminating the § 102(b) limitation should be equally
uneventful. A geographical limitation on prior art evidence
may or may not be a more "convenient" rule for trials and other
proceedings, 17 3 but as it is constitutionally indefensible,
convenience is irrelevant.
The Constitution requires that any patent system created
by Congress must promote the progress of useful arts. The
Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase as providing a clear
limitation on Congressional power in this area:
Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are
to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict
free access to materials already available. Innovation, advancement,
and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent
requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must
'promote the Progress of... useful Arts." This is the standard
expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored. 74
As described above, foreign public knowledge or use, as a
class of information, is now as "publicly accessible" as foreign
patents and printed publications were in 1836. By explicitly
allowing the patenting of such publicly accessible information,
the § 102(b) geographical limitation does not promote the
progress of the useful arts and thus violates the "standard
expressed in the Constitution."175 Consequently, it must be
eliminated.
III. OTHER REASONS FOR REVISING THE DEFINITION
OF PRIOR ART: "PIRACY," POLICY, AND HARMONY
In addition to constitutional arguments, policy arguments
support the elimination of § 102(b)'s geographical limitation.
Changes in sources of invention inspiration, a move toward
global harmonization of patent laws, and the U.S. government's
own stance towards piracy, all militate in favor of a global
definition of prior art.
A. PIRACY AND BIOPIRACY
While the changes in research habits noted in Part II are
GATTastrophic for the United States Patent System - or Both?, AIPLA BULL.,
Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 196-200.
173. H.R. REP. No. 79-1498. at 7 (1946) (concluding that the exclusion "is
the greater convenience in trials and other proceedings held in this country").
microformed on CIS No. 11022 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
174. Graham v. John Deere Co., 365 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
175. Id.
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yielding beneficial discoveries, they are also, in some cases,
causing considerable problems. Where the research culminates
in the patenting of information derived from the traditional
knowledge or genetic resources of indigenous peoples in
developing countries, it is often labeled "biopiracy." The term
biopiracy has been defined as "the patenting of plants, genes,
and other biological products that are indigenous to a foreign
country"176  without compensating the keepers of those
resources and the holders of knowledge appropriated during
the ethnobiological research process. 177 This is in contrast to
the word "piracy" which is defined as "the unauthorized use of
copyrighted or patented work."178  As explained by one
commentator: "What developing tropical nations are saying is
that if the West cries foul over piracy of intellectual property,
[such as] computer software, then biopiracy in Western labs of
jungle extracts should also be considered a high economic
crime." 179
The geographical limitation contained in § 102(b)
facilitates biopiracy by preventing evidence of foreign
knowledge or use from being considered in patentability and
patent validity proceedings. 180 This is problematic for the
United States because, among other things, it is hypocritical of
the United States to fight intellectual property piracy in
developing countries but to allow piracy against developing
countries at home (thus potentially increasing pirating of U.S.
intellectual property). Also, to the extent biopiracy decimates
176. The Word Spy, at http://www.wordspy.com/words/biopiracy.asp (last
visited Oct. 6, 2002). The question of how to compensate indigenous groups
and sovereign nations for the patenting of even novel and nonobvious
inventions that may have been developed with the aid of ethnobiological
research is a troublesome issue that is beyond the scope of this Article. The
focus here is more narrow and is directed to the problems the § 102(b)
geographical limitation creates, including when it intersects biopiracy
concerns.
177. Faiola, supra note 30, at A21 (explaining that tropical nations are
pushing for legislation aimed at preventing biopiracy by requiring foreign
nations to pay royalties for biomaterials used abroad).
178. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 468 (Macmillan
1996).
179. Faiola, supra note 30, at A21.
180. Eliminating the § 102(b) geographical limitation will not, however,
end claims of biopiracy by indigenous groups and others since inventions
based on traditional knowledge and genetic resources will still be patentable
as long as they are novel and nonobvious in view of the prior art. There would
still be no requirement in patent law that inventors compensate traditional
knowledge holders for sharing that knowledge.
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or prevents the creation of foreign industries (e.g., the impact of
the Enola bean patent on Mexican bean farmers and exporters),
it may increase the need for continuing U.S. aid to developing
countries as opposed to helping those countries move towards
self-sufficiency. 181
Under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) is authorized to take
action against foreign countries that deny what the United
States perceives as adequate and effective intellectual property
protection and equitable market access to U.S. intellectual
property owners.18 2 Countries failing to meet U.S. standards
are placed on "watch lists" and failure to make significant
progress on stopping piracy and enforcing intellectual property
laws can result in U.S. trade sanctions. 183 Although the TRIPS
agreement mandates substantive protections, an amendment to
the TRIPS implementing legislation allows the USTR to pursue
action against a country under section 301 even if the country
is in compliance with its TRIPS obligations. Not surprisingly,
this aggressive stance on piracy has generated significant ill
will against the United States, especially when U.S. inventors
and multinational corporations are committing what some
developing countries see as "biopiracy" in the very countries the
USTR is chastising. 184
181. See, e.g., Kadidal, supra note 44, at 377-88 (noting that W.R. Grace's
U.S. neem oil patent "may deny indigenous Indian companies access to the
U.S. market, which may be the largest and most lucrative one"). But see
Marden, supra note 48, at 285 (noting that an argument had been made that
Indian farmers may benefit from the Grace patent by making neem a new
cash crop).
182. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b), (d)(3)(B)(i)(II-III) (2002).
183. See United States Trade Representative, 2000 Special 301 Report, at
http://www.ustr.gov/html/special.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2002) (reporting
detailed examination of the adequacy and effectiveness of intellectual property
protection in seventy countries, identifying fifty-nine trading partners for
various levels of watch list status and noting that "[wihile progress also has
been made on improving enforcement in many countries, the unacceptably
high rates of piracy and counterfeiting of U.S. intellectual property around the
world require on-going vigilance").
184. According to Indian scientist and activist Dr. Vandana Shiva,
When [the] US was introducing Intellectual Property Rights in the
Uruguay Round, as a new issue, the US had accused the Third World
of "piracy". The estimates provided for royalties lost in agricultural
chemicals are USD 202 million and USD 2,545 million for
pharmaceuticals. However, as the team at RAFI, the Rural
Advancement Foundation International, in Canada has shown, if the
contribution of Third World peasants and tribals is taken into
account, the roles are dramatically reversed: the US owes USD 302
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The Mexican Enola bean controversy illustrates how
§ 102(b) can serve as a barrier to U.S. trade for foreigners.
There, Mexican bean importers (at least one of whom had
started her business to capitalize on the free trade
opportunities created by NAFTA) and the farmers they
represent, were effectively barred from the U.S. yellow bean
import business by the grant of a patent whose acquisition
appears to have been facilitated by § 102(b)'s geographical
limitation. 85  This is unfortunate in many respects. It
negatively impacts the farmers, importers, and their families,
as well as the communities in which they operate and, perhaps
only marginally, Mexico's ability to increase its gross domestic
product, exports, and employed labor force. 186 Since many
developing countries that receive aid from the United States
and other developed countries are also rich in genetic resources
and traditional knowledge, U.S. patent policies and practices
that close the U.S. market to burgeoning industries in those
countries may retard the ability of those countries to become
fully self-sufficient and independent of foreign aid. 187
B. POLICIES UNDERLYING SECTION 102(B)
In addition to facilitating biopiracy, the geographical
limitation undermines at least the first and fourth of the four
well-established policies that justify §102(b)'s existence. These
policies are:
(1) discouraging the removal, from the public domain, of inventions
million in royalties for agriculture and 5,097 million for
pharmaceuticals to Third World countries, according to these latter
estimates. In other words, in these two biological industry sectors
alone, the US owes 2.7 billion dollars to the "Third World".
Vandana Shiva, The Turmeric Patent Is Just the First Step in Stopping
Biopiracy, http://www.sodepaz.orglcooperacion/agricultura/shiva.htm (last
visited Oct. 11, 2002). Again, revising § 102(b) to include foreign public
knowledge or use as prior art alone will not end accusations of biopiracy
against the United States, see discussion supra note 180, but it is a step in the
right direction.
185. See discussion supra notes 81-88.
186. In terms of NAFTA countries, Mexico's Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
in 2000 was $574 billion, Canada's was $689 billion, and the United States'
was $9.896 trillion. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 130, at 841 tbl. 1340.
Note also the percentages of persons ages 20-24 years old not in education or
at work: Mexico, 26.2%; Canada, 11.7%; U.S., 14.4%. Id. at 847 tbl. 1352.
187. U.S. foreign aid disbursements are increasing. See id. at 797 tbl.
1293. In 1980, the United States provided $9.695 billion in economic and
military aid programs to foreign countries. By 1999, that number had
increased to $15.987 billion. Id.
20031
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that the public reasonably has come to believe are freely available; (2)
favoring the prompt and widespread disclosure of inventions; (3)
allowing the inventor a reasonable amount of time following sales
activity to determine the potential economic value of a patent; and (4)
prohibiting the inventor from commercially exploiting the invention
for a period greater than the statutorily prescribed time.'
The geographical limitation is problematic from the first policy
standpoint in three different scenarios. First, it allows third
parties to patent information publicly known or used in a
foreign country even though they were not aware of the earlier
knowledge or use. Second, it facilitates violations of § 102(f) by
making it easier for third parties to patent derived information
from foreign sources that they did not themselves invent.
Lastly, it allows inventors to make and use their inventions in
foreign countries for a potentially unlimited period of time
before filing for a U.S. application as long as the inventions are
not otherwise patented or described in a printed publication.18 9
All three scenarios thus violate the first § 102(b) policy of
protecting public reliance on information in the public domain.
One might argue that the U.S. public has not relied on having
access to inventions known or used in foreign countries, but the
same could be said for foreign patents and printed publications
such as those discussed in In re Hall and In re Carlson.190
Foreign public knowledge or use should be treated the same as
these traditional sources of prior art.
Moreover, the third scenario violates the fourth 102(b)
policy of not allowing an inventor to commercialize her
188. Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Cobe Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
189. Of course, not all applicants for U.S. patents are U.S. citizens or
residents. In fact, nearly half the U.S. patents granted by the USPTO each
year go to foreign inventors. U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963-2001,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us-stat.pdf (last
visited Nov. 15, 2002). Thus, the § 102 limitation allows foreign (or U.S.)
inventors to sell and practice their invention in foreign countries for years and
then decide to come to the United States and get a patent, as long as that use
is not described in a patent or printed publication. On the other hand, once an
inventor sells or publicly uses her invention in the United States, § 102(b)
gives her just a year within which to file a patent application. So, in theory at
least, the geographical limitation appears to disadvantage U.S. patent
applicants that reside in the United States as opposed to those who reside in a
foreign country. This distinction violates the policies of encouraging prompt
disclosure of inventions and the non-commercialization of inventions beyond
the patent term without justification because § 102(b) does not differentiate
between acts of inventors and acts of third parties.
190. See In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1035-37 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Hall,
781 F.2d 897, 898-99 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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invention for more than the one-year grace period provided in
the statute before seeking patent protection. Because the
patent laws of most countries bar patents on inventions
publicly known or used in that country, if not the world, few
inventors are likely to rely on this loophole in U.S. law because
they would void their right to obtain a patent in other
countries. 191 Nevertheless, the loophole is real and eliminating
§ 102(b)'s geographical limitation would close it and better
effectuate the policies underlying the statute.
Thus, constitutional constraints, biopiracy, and policy
conflicts are all implicated by the § 102(b) geographical
limitation. One more issue deserves a brief mention: § 102(b)'s
geographical limitation is at odds with the laws of the three
other major patent granting institutions on the global scene.
C. HARMONIZATION: THE URGE TO MERGE
An additional consequence of an even smaller world is an
increase in efforts by nations to harmonize their laws and enter
treaties to facilitate world trade. Patent law has historically
been territorial in nature, with sovereign states granting
patents and providing means for patentees to enforce their
rights only within their borders. 192 Consequently, if a person
wanted to obtain patent protection for an invention in multiple
countries, she would have to apply for a patent in each country
of interest because the exclusionary rights provided would not
extend beyond the state's borders.
While this territorial model is still in effect, it is slowly
changing. A variety of treaties streamline the process of a
multi-country patent application and reduce associated costs.
More of such treaties are in development. 193 Several regional
191. See, e.g., EPC, art. 54, supra note 15, 13 I.L.M. at 286; Japan Patent
Law, ch. 2, art. 29 (1998), reprinted in 2 F. JOHN P. SINNOTT ET AL., WORLD
PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE, Japan-153, Japan-172 (2002).
192. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. 271(a) (2000) (defining a person liable for patent
infringement when that person "without authority makes, uses, offers to sell,
or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States any patented invention"); Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial
Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505,
520-26 (1997) (discussing the territoriality of U.S. patent law).
193. E.g., Patent Law Treaty, June 1, 2000, at http://www.wipo.int/clea/
docs/en/wo/wo038en.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) [hereinafter PLT]; Patent
Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231,
available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/index.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2002);
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 302, available at 1970 WL 104436; see also Gerald
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treaties already exist that allow an applicant to file one
application with a central office and obtain patent protection in
multiple countries, although the patent must be enforced (in
cases of infringement) in each individual country. 94
Probably the most significant regional treaty is the
Convention on the Grant of European Patents (EPC), signed in
1973 by a group of countries seeking to create a uniform
European patent system. 195 The EPC, which currently has
twenty-four contracting members, and six extension states, 196
established the European Patent Office (EPO) and contains
substantive and procedural requirements for obtaining a
European patent (valid in all member countries) with only a
single application. 197 Unlike the U.S. Patent Act, the EPC has
J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo, World Patent System Circa 20XX, A.D., 38
IDEA 529 (1998) (discussing various patent treaties).
194. EPC, supra note 15, 13 I.L.M. at 269; Eurasian Patent Convention, 36
Indus. Prop. & Copyright 30 (1997).
195. See, e.g., What is the European Patent Office?, at http://www.european-
patent-office.org/epo/pubs/brochure/general/e/epo-general.htm (last updated
Oct. 18,2002). The EPC went into effect in 1977. Id.
196. Id. at http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/pubs/brochure/
general/e/contractstatese.htm) (last updated Oct. 18, 2002). Current
contracting states are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, United
Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Slovak Republic, Sweden, and Turkey. Current
Extension states are: Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Romania, and Slovenia. Id. Membership in the organization is
not limited to European Union (EU) countries although all EU countries are
members. Id. "Extension states" are expected to become members in due
course and patent applicants can currently designate them on a European
patent application. What is the European Patent Office?, at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/pubs/brochure/general/e/epo-
general.htm (last updated Oct. 18,2002).
197. The European patent is treated as a national patent in each member
country. EPC, art. 64, supra note 15, 13 I.L.M. at 287. Applicants can still
seek patent protection in individual EPC member countries exclusively or
concurrently; however, because the European patent is treated as a national
patent, only one patent (national or European) will generally be maintained.
See Citizen Watch Co., 1993 R.P.C. 1, Aug. 17, 1992 (Eng. Royal Patent
Office), LEXIS, Nexis, United Kingdom File (revoking United Kingdom patent
no. 2,176,660 because a European Community patent had been granted to the
same inventor for the same invention). The laws of all member states must be
in harmony with the EPC on patentability standards so those laws do not
geographically limit sources of prior art either. EPC, art. 1, 2, & 54. supra
note 15, 13 I.L.M. at 276, 277, & 286. Unfortunately, there is no central
means for enforcing a European patent. The Community Patent Frequently
Asked Questions, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal market/en/indprop/
patent/2k-4.htm (last updated July 5, 2000). A patentee must still (in most
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never contained a geographical limitation on prior art. Article
54 of the EPC, which defines novelty, states in pertinent part,
1. An invention shall be considered to be new if it does not form part
of the state of the art. 2. The state of the art shall be held to comprise
everything made available to the public by means of a written or oral
description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the
European patent application.1
98
The determination of the nonobviousness of the invention,
or the presence of an "inventive step" as denoted in the EPC, is
also made with reference to the state of the art as defined in
Article 54.199 Consequently, evidence of foreign public
knowledge or use has been admissible in EPO proceedings and
infringement litigation for over two decades. In fact, this
broad, geographically neutral definition of prior art is what
enabled evidence of foreign public use in India to be used to
revoke Grace's European patent on neem.20 0 While it can be
difficult for proponents of non-patent, non-published prior art,
foreign or domestic, to meet the strict standards of proof and
credibility required by the EPO, the inclusive definition is
clearly workable and in use in EPO decisions. 20 1
The EPO and its contracting and extension states, as a
group, grant the highest number of patents annually, followed
by the United States and Japan. 20 2 Over 80% of the world's
patents are granted by the EPO, USPTO, and the Japanese
Patent Office (JPO) combined. Thus, it was not a complete
circumstances) bring suit in each country where the patent is being infringed.
Id. Efforts are underway to create a Community patent that would be a "true"
European patent, enforceable in a single court with community-wide effect.
See Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Patent, at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2000/en_500PC0412.pdf (Aug. 8, 2001).
198. EPC, art 54, supra note 15, 13 I.L.M. at 286.
199. EPC, art. 56, supra note 15, 13 I.L.M. at 286.
200. See Decision Revoking the European Patent No. EP-B-0436257, EPO,
Ref. No. 30159, at 1-4 (Feb. 13, 2001) (available from European Patent Office;
on file with the author).
201. See, e.g., Hercules Inc. v. BASF Ag., Doc. T 0739/92, LEXIS EPOBOA
(European Patent Office Board of Appeal) file (1996); Thorn EMI v. E.G.O.
Elektro-GerCte Blanc, Doc.T 0326/93, LEXIS EPOBOA file (1994); Genentech
v. Boehringer, Doc. T 0455/91, LEXIS EPOBOA file (1994).
202. Over 350,000 patents were granted by the EPO and its contracting
and extension states in 1999 (35,358 by the EPO itself); 153,487 were granted
by the USPTO, and 150,059 granted by the Japanese Patent Office. See
IP/STAT/1999/B, Patents/Brevets: Patent applications filed and patents
granted during 1999, at http://www.wipo.org/ipstats/en/publications/b/index.
html (last visited Oct. 6, 2002). The numbers drop off considerably after that,
with the next highest number being the Republic of Korea with 62,635,
followed by Canada with 13,778 patents granted in 1999. Id.
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surprise when, in 1983, these three organizations got together
and formed a trilateral co-operation effort, with the goal of
increasing efficiency in the processing of applications through
exchanging information on automation, comparative practices,
and database creation. 203
Until recently, Japan's definition of prior art mirrored 35
U.S.C. §102 in that the Japanese Patent Act limited the
geographical scope of relevant non-patent, non-published public
knowledge or use to Japan. However, in 1999, Japan took a
major step forward in implementing its twenty-first century
"pro-patent" policy when the Japanese Diet made several
significant amendments to the Japan Patent Law.20 4 One of
the amendments eliminated geographical prior art distinctions.
Now in Japan, applicants cannot patent,
[iinventions which were publicly known in Japan or
elsewhere;... inventions which were publicly worked in Japan or
elsewhere; ... inventions which were described in a distributed
publication or made available to the public through electric
telecommunication lines in Japan or elsewhere prior to the filing of
the patent application.
2 5
A 1998 report prepared by the Planning Subcommittee of
Japan's Industrial Property Council identified three key
203. See Trilateral Website, http://www.jpo.go.jp/saikine/tws/gen-l.htm
(last visited Oct. 6, 2002).
204. Japan Patent Law No. 220 art. 29 (1999) (entering into force Jan. 6,
2001) (amending Japan Patent Law No. 121 (1959)), http://www.jpo.go.jp/
shoukaie/patent.htm (last updated July 27, 2001). Japan has a long history of
importing foreign technology and diffusing it throughout Japanese industry.
See Robert J. Girouard, U.S. Trade Policy and the Japanese Patent System,
Berkeley Roundtable on the Int'l Econ. Working Paper 89 (Aug. 1996),
http://brie.berkeley.edu/pubs/wp/index.html (noting that because of Japan's
late-developer status, it "favor[s] the importation, indigenization, and diffusion
of foreign technology" as opposed to a focus on technical superiority through
basic research). Japan's approach, however, resulted in a substantial
technological trade imbalance with the United States, which Japan has been
working to eliminate through implementation of pro-patent policies such as
the 1999 legislation. Report of the Planning Subcommittee of the Industrial
Property Council: To the Better Understanding of Pro-Patent Policy, Japanese
Patent Office, 5, 8, http://www.jpo.go.jp/saikine/ report.pdf (Nov. 1998). These
changes are designed to allow Japan "to shift from emphasis on the
development of improvement technology to the development of highly creative
technology having added value." Id. at 5. It is ironic that Japan sees
eliminating geographical prior art limitations as allowing it to be more
technologically competitive with the United States, which still has such
limitations. See 35 U.S.C. § 102.
205. Japan Patent Law No. 220 art. 29, http://www.jpo.go.jp/shoukaie/
patent.htm. "Working" an invention means to put it into practice
commercially, similar to the U.S. concept of "using" an invention.
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reasons for revising the definition of novelty-destroying
information: (1) a perception that granting patents in Japan on
technology in the global public domain would delay the
development of Japanese industry since Japanese inventors
and companies would be unable to use the technology; (2)
allowing the patenting of technology in the global public
domain gives the impression that Japan is an imitator, not a
pioneer in technology development; and (3) while "surveying"
(i.e., accessing) foreign known and worked inventions was
difficult at the time the old law was enacted in 1959, it has now
become relatively easy to access such information so the rule
should be "expanded to include the entire world."20 6
Apparently, the Industrial Property Council, which
recommended the revision to the JPO for drafting and passage
by the Japanese Diet, was concerned that if the JPO granted
patents on inventions that were publicly known in foreign
countries, Japan would fall behind those countries in research
and development because Japanese inventors would not be able
to use inventions which are freely usable in other countries. 20 7
That leaves the United States as the only trilateral member to
retain geographical limitation on prior art. Harmonizing the
definition of prior art among these three entities seems
appropriate, not just for the benefits to trilateral cooperation
projects such as the sharing of prior art search results, but also
for the benefits to consumers and inventors in the United
States. 208
206. See Report of the Planning Subcommittee of the Industrial Property
Council, supra note 204, at 85-86. The report states,
[Ihf patents are granted ... in Japan for inventions known or worked
overseas (public domain), .... technology able to be freely used
overseas cannot be used in Japan, thereby causing a delay in the
development of technology. In addition, this may also give the
impression of encouraging the imitation of technology ... resulting in
a system that... run[s] contrary to the direction in which Japan is
heading of shifting from catch-up-type to frontier-type research and
development. In addition, since it has become relatively easy to
conduct surveys about facts relating to known or worked inventions
overseas ... due to the progress of transportation means in recent
years, the formation of a border-less economy and the progress of
means of providing information ... there is no longer any reason to
establish regional standards for known or worked inventions in.
Japan.
Id.
207. Id. at 85.
208. Even Canada, the fifth highest patent granter on the list, see supra
note 202 and accompanying text, eliminated its section 102(b)-like
geographical limitation on prior art in 1989. See Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch..
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Ironically, the geographical limitation that the Court in
Gayler v. Wilder perceived as a benefit to U.S. consumers may
actually disadvantage U.S. consumers because so many other
countries' patent laws do not contain similar geographical prior
art limitations.20 9 Section 102(b) thus promotes and allows
monopoly prices here on goods that could possibly be purchased
more cheaply in other countries where the subject matter is not
patentable and competition is thus available. 210
Patent law harmonization has long been an elusive goal for
many countries and probably will remain out of reach for some
time to come.211 However, new harmonization efforts are
actively underway under the auspices of the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO). Following the successful
conclusion of the Patent Law Treaty (PLT) negotiations in
2000, WIPO member states agreed to move forward with efforts
to achieve harmonization on substantive patent law issues with
the objectives of reducing the costs of obtaining patent
protection worldwide, and achieving mutual recognition/full
33 §27 (1985) (Can.); see also Michel H. Goulet, Novelty Under Canada's
Patent Act-A European Accent, 13 INTELL. PROP. J. 83, 84 (1999).
Of course, the United States, members of the EPC, and Japan lack
agreement on other provisions, most notably the issue of whether a patent
should be awarded to the first inventor (i.e., the U.S. approach) or the first
person to file a patent application covering the invention. While ultimately
the United States will likely join the rest of the world in adopting a first-to-file
regime, there are arguably better justifications for retaining that distinction in
U.S. law than can possibly be mustered for retaining the § 102 geographical
limitation.
209. See Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 497 (1850).
210. See supra note 208 (discussing the benefits of patent law
harmonization).
211. Intellectual property treaties, most dealing with procedural aspects of
patent obtainment, have been around since the late nineteenth century. See
Stockholm Convention for Multilateral Protection of Industrial Property, and
the Paris Convention, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 302,
available at 1970 WL 104436 (revising Paris Convention for Protection of
Industrial Property, March 20, 1883). A treaty with substantive provisions,
TRIPS seems to be the pattern of the future for achieving patent law
harmonization: tying intellectual property protection to trade. See Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay
Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L.
275, 276-77 (1997). While patent law harmonization among developed
countries seems to offer significant benefits, it is not at all clear that requiring
developing countries to bring their patent laws into compliance with those of
developed countries, as is required by many TRIPS provisions, is beneficial to
those developing economies. That discussion, however, is for another day and
another article.
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faith and credit for the results of substantive examination. 212
Five topics were selected for the WIPO Standing Committee on
the Law of Patents (SCP) to begin work on immediately, with
work on stickier issues delayed for a second stage. 213 One of
the five topics is defining a global definition of prior art,
without any geographical limitations. 214  While the U.S.
representative to the WIPO SCP has agreed in principle to such
a definition, there still very well could be a "slip twixt the cup
and the lip."215 In other words, while agreement may be
reached at WIPO (still probably two or more years away),
getting countries to sign such a treaty probably will await its
incorporation into a trade-related agreement like TRIP's, and
the likelihood of continued special interest group pressure in
the United States may hinder Congressional action on such a
treaty.
The bigger problem with waiting for § 102(b) to be fixed via
WIPO or TRIPS is that the provision, in the WIPO
negotiations, is apparently being used by the United States as
a bargaining chip, to achieve other concessions from
negotiating parties. However, as discussed above, 216
elimination of § 102(b)'s geographical limitation is a
constitutional imperative to be accomplished either by the
Supreme Court, if an appropriate case is presented to it, or
Congress by legislative amendment of § 102. It is incumbent
on the Supreme Court to police patent statutes for compliance
with constitutional constraints. Congress is also obligated to
conform its legislation to the Intellectual Property Clause from
which its legislative patent power emanates. 217
For all of the above reasons, a move by the United States
to a definition of prior art inclusive of foreign knowledge or use
212. See Issues Considered by the Standing Committee on the Law of
Patents, World Intellectual Property Organization, http://www.wipo.org/ipl/en/
ipl-01.htm (discussed at the Sixth Session, Nov. 5-9, 2001).
213. Id. "Stickier" issues include the first to file versus first to invent and
post-grant opposition proceedings. Id.
214. Id. Those five topics are definitions of prior art, novelty,
nonobviousness (i.e. inventive step), and industrial applicability; sufficiency of
disclosure of patent applications; and the structure and interpretation of
claims.
215. EBENEZER COBHAM BREWER, BREWER'S DICTONARY OF PHRASE &
FABLE, 839 (11th ed., Harper & Row 1968) (1870), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/81/15519.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2002) ("Many a
slip 'twixt the cup and the lip. Everything is uncertain until you possess it.")
216. See discussion supra notes 25- 39.
217. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 8.
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must be a question of "when," not "if." Moreover, as discussed
below, there are meaningful benefits to be reaped from the
change that could actually improve the quality of patents
issuing from the USPTO.
D. PRIOR ART UNLIMITED BY GEOGRAPHY: APPLICATIONS
Revising § 102(b) to eliminate the geographical limitation
on prior art could result in a provision like the following:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
The invention was part of the prior art more than one year prior to the
date of the application for patent. The prior art with respect to an invention
shall consist of all information that has been made available to the public
anywhere in the world.
2 18
Such a definition would retain the beneficial one-year
grace period allowing inventors time to assess the commercial
potential of their invention and prepare a patent application to
cover it, while eliminating artificial and outdated limitations on
sources of prior art. Would adopting such a definition really
impact the "quality" of U.S. patents? In some cases, yes.
The patentability of an invention is generally assessed at
two different points and places: 1) during prosecution of the
patent application in the USPTO, and 2) after the patent
issues, either in a USPTO post-grant proceeding or in district
court litigation. The change in definition of prior art that will
come from eliminating the geographical limitation concerns
evidence in a form not traditionally considered to any
meaningful extent during the examination of patent
applications: non-patent, non-printed publication prior art.
Consequently, the change will not impact the quality of most
patents issuing from the USPTO unless such prior art is
asserted in district court litigation involving the patent.219
218. This language is a variation of an alternative proposed by the WIPO
SCP. See Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty, Sept. 24, 2001, World
Intellectual Property Organization, art. 8, para. 1, http://www.wipo.org/scp/en/
documents/session_6/pdffscp6_2.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2001)(proposed at
Sixth Session, Nov. 5-9, 2001).
219. Having to wait until after a patent is issued to attack it is ill-timed
because issued patents have a presumption of validity that can only be
overcome with a showing of clear and convincing evidence. See 35 U.S.C. §
282 (2000); see also Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and
Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 44 (2001) ("To
invalidate an issued patent, an infringement defendant must overcome a
strong presumption of validity. If an infringement defendant loses a validity
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Despite this fact, a new USPTO rule offers a glimmer of hope
for improving the quality of patents during prosecution along
with a statutory revision of § 102(b) eliminating the
geographical limitation on prior art.
Rule 37 C.F.R § 1.105, entitled Requirement for
Information, grants USPTO patent examiners broad discretion
to require a patent applicant to provide information that is
deemed "reasonably necessary" to properly examine the
application. 220 This rule, in conjunction with the elimination of
the prior art geographical limitation, could go a long way
towards eliminating bad patents that cover foreign public
knowledge or use while maintaining an applicant's ability to
patent worthy inventions of proper scope and novelty.221
Although the USPTO gives numerous examples of the
types of information that can be required from an applicant, an
examiner is not limited to those examples. 222 Consequently,
the rule should extend to requiring applicants to disclose
known uses of a claimed invention (here or abroad),
information used in the invention process, country and exact
geographical location from which information about the
invention was obtained (to aid in prior art searches), any
searches of traditional knowledge sources conducted by the
applicant, orally transmitted traditional knowledge, and
information accessed or believed to be accessible in commercial
databases (including depositories). 223  Properly used by
examiners, section 1.105 should result in applicants being more
forthcoming with relevant information and thus should allow
for improved examination of applications and higher quality
challenge, as most do, the infringement analysis leaves little room for
consideration of relevant but uncited prior art.").
220. 37 C.F.R. § 1.105(a)(1) (2001) provides in relevant part,
In the course of examining or treating a matter in a pending or
abandoned application filed under 35 U.S.C. § 111 or 371 (including a
reissue application), in a patent, or in a reexamination proceeding,
the examiner or other Office employee may require the submission,
from individuals identified under § 1.56(c), or any assignee, of such
information as may be reasonably necessary to properly examine or
treat the matter ....
221. For example, foreign knowledge or use that is not secret, such as a
shaman's "trade" secrets, would not be deemed publicly accessible and would
not constitute relevant prior art. Also, products that are isolated or purified so
that they are neither identical to nor obvious in view of a product of nature
still would be patentable, though whether the latter category of products
should be patentable remains a debatable topic.
222. 37 C.F.R. § 1.105 (2001).
223. See Wiser & Downes, supra note 137, at 8.
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patents. 224
If a patent issues that is not novel or is obvious in view of
prior foreign public knowledge or use, a party seeking relief can
try to obtain correction of the patent in the USPTO or seek to
have the patent invalidated in federal district court litigation.
There is currently little chance that it could be corrected in the
USPTO by a complaining indigenous group or other third
party. This is because reexamination is the only patent
correction procedure currently available in the USPTO that
may be instigated by a party other than the patentee, and the
limitations associated with reexaminations are significant. 225
The current USPTO ex parte and inter partes
reexamination procedures are, in theory, designed to allow for
the correction of bad patents that may have slipped through the
examination process.226 In fact, patents on the use of turmeric
224. One could ask whether improving patent quality is even a worthwhile
objective. In his essay Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, Professor Mark
Lemley posits that because very few patents are actually litigated or licensed,
strengthening the USPTO examination process is not cost-effective. Mark A.
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1497
(2001) (noting that under this reasoning, the USPTO is "rationally ignorant'
of the objective validity of patents" it issues). He states that instead "society
ought to resign itself to the fact that bad patents will issue and [should]
attempt to deal with the problem ex post, if the patent is asserted in
litigation." Id. at 1511.
This position certainly has merit and, of course, litigation still will be the
forum where many bad patents will be corrected. Yet changing the definition
of prior art to include foreign knowledge or use will not necessarily increase
the PTO's cost of examination (although the cost to the applicant could
certainly be expected to increase somewhat). Certainly, to the extent
examiners are not familiar with analyzing this type of prior art, more time for
examination might be required in the short term. In the longer term,
however, eliminating the geographical limitation on prior art need not
meaningfully increase the amount of time an examiner spends on a file, but it
should improve the quality of his or her examination by allowing more
relevant prior art to be reviewed. The USPTO instituted a similar approach
for the examination of business method patents, allocating more time for
examination where the sources and types of prior art are non-traditional. See
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, WHITE PAPER: AUTOMATED
FINANCIAL OR MANAGEMENT DATA PROCESSING METHODS (BUSINESS
METHODS), http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/index.html (March 20,
2000).
225. Reissues and disclaimers, the two other main patent correction
measures, may only be initiated by the patentee. 35 USC §§ 251, 253 (2000).
While 35 U.S.C. § 301 allows third parties to have copies of prior art patents
and printed publications placed in the file of a patent, prior art in other forms
is excluded.
226. 35 U.S.C. §§ 302-307, 311-318 (2000).
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as a healing aid227 and on the Ecuadorian ayahuasca plant
were both revoked in reexamination proceedings based on prior
art printed publications. 228 Yet both reexamination options are
deeply flawed and provide even less opportunity for the
correction of patents covering foreign public knowledge or use
patents than for other types of patents because the "substantial
new question of patentability" required for initiation of a
reexamination proceeding currently can only be based on prior
art patents or printed publications.229 Consequently, even if
the § 102(a) and (b) definitions of prior art are amended to
eliminate the geographical "in this country" limitation evidence
of prior foreign knowledge or use would not be usable to obtain
reexamination of this type of patent. To make reexamination a
meaningful alternative to litigation would require legislation
allowing evidence of public knowledge or use to provide a basis
for instituting a reexamination. 230
Short of new such legislation revamping the patent
reexamination system, parties desiring to contest a bad patent
on the basis of prior foreign knowledge or use still will be forced
to seek relief through federal district court patent invalidity
litigation even if the geographical limitation on prior art is
eliminated. In this situation, another benefit of the 37 C.F.R. §
1.105 requirement for information becomes apparent. A patent
applicant's response to the PTO under 37 C.F.R. § 1.105 must
comply with the 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 duty of disclosure and candor
imposed on everyone associated with the filing of an application
227. See Kumar, supra note 23, at 724.
228. See Fecteau, supra note 43, at 85-86.
229. 35 U.S.C. §§ 303, 312.
230. Despite this seemingly bleak situation, there is hope in the form of
several pieces of pending legislation. On June 19, 2001, Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-
Calif.) introduced a bill, H.R. 2231, that would expand the types of prior art
usable as a basis for inter partes reexamination of an issued patent. Under
the bill, anyone, within one year of a patent's issuance, could request
reexamination based on "evidence of subject matter described in section 102(a)
or (b) [including prior sale, knowledge, or public use], alone or in combination
with prior art that may be cited under section 301 [patents and printed
publications]." H.R. 2231, 17th Cong. (2001) (latest major action referred to
the House Committee on the Judiciary, June 19, 2001, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.html). Allowing prior foreign knowledge or
use to be used in a reexamination could be decisive in determining whether a
patent should be revoked. For example, as noted earlier, none of the
challenges to U.S. patents related to neem oil have as yet been successful.
Unfortunately, both the timing and likelihood of passage of any such
legislation-to change the definition of prior art or to improve reexamination
proceedings-is uncertain.
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for patent.231 Consequently, if a party attacking a patent is
able to show that the patentee intentionally withheld
information material to patentability, especially in response to
a requirement for information from the PTO, the patent could
be rendered unenforceable for inequitable conduct.232 Such a
possibility should encourage applicants to be forthcoming in
providing evidence of use, even non-published use, that could
be material to patentability and certainly information that is
specifically requested by the examiner. 233
Eliminating the geographical limitation on prior art is not
a fix-all for the patent system. Even with the change bad
patents will still issue. This is not to suggest that eliminating
the geographical limitation is pointless. It is an important first
step in the task of making patent law more robust and just.
CONCLUSION
It is past time for the United States, through Congress or
the Supreme Court, to comply with the Constitution and
acknowledge that the world is too small for the continued
exclusion of evidence of foreign public knowledge or use from
patentability analyses. Public knowledge or use of an invention
anywhere in the world is something that we all share as part of
231. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2001).
232. GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1272-75 (Fed. Cir.
2001)(holding patent unenforceable for inequitable conduct where patentee
failed to disclose material prior art references).
233. See Critikon, Inc. v. Becton-Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d
1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that "[iut is axiomatic that '[close cases
should be resolved by disclosure, not unilaterally by applicants" (quoting
LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1076
(Fed. Cir. 1992))). The court also noted that
[n]o single factor or combination of factors can be said always to
require an inference of intent to mislead; yet a patentee facing a high
level of materiality and clear proof that it knew or should have known
of that materiality, can expect to find it difficult to establish
"subjective good faith" sufficient to prevent the drawing of an
inference of intent to mislead. A mere denial of intent to mislead
(which would defeat every effort to establish inequitable conduct) will
not suffice in such circumstances.
Id.
Another ramification of eliminating the geographical limitation is that the
hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art would be charged with foreign
public knowledge or use in the same way that this hypothetical person is
charged with knowledge of public use in private laboratories and of doctoral
theses in far away libraries. This change may not result in many findings that
an invention is anticipated, but, if properly applied, could be quite relevant in
obviousness determinations.
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the global public domain.
Over the past twenty years we have witnessed the ever-
expanding scope of subject matter deemed eligible for utility
patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Living organisms, 234
computer software, 235 business methods,236 and most recently,
sexually reproduced plants237 have all been identified as clearly
appropriate subject matter under U.S. patent law. As the
Supreme Court and Congress have made clear, "anything
under the sun that is made by man" is patent-eligible,
regardless of geographic origin. 238 If that is indeed the case,
then certainly the prior art against which the patentability of
that subject matter will be measured must be equally as
inclusive without regard to the geographical origin of the
information.
The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution only
authorizes Congress to secure exclusive rights to inventors for
the purpose of advancing the progress of the useful arts. "The
[Intellectual Property Clause] itself reflects a balance between
the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of
monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant
advance in the 'Progress of Science and useful Arts.' 239 To the
extent § 102's geographical limitation allows for the reward of
patent rights without the requisite concomitant advance in the
useful arts, it is unconstitutional.
Elimination of the "in this country" limitation on non-
patent or published prior art in U.S. patent law is long overdue.
234. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980) (holding
that genetically engineered mirco-organisms qualify as "patentable subject
matter under § 101").
235. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, 172 F.3d 1352, 1361
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that a patent claim to a computer program is in "the
broad scope of patentable subject matter under § 101"); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d
1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (concluding that "a computer operating
system pursuant to software may represent patentable subject matter" if it
"meets all of the other requriments of Title 35").
236. See, e.g., State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149
F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting, in dicta, that there is no exception to
the patentability of business methods under § 101).
237. See, e.g., J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 122 S.
Ct. 593, 606 (2001) (holding that "newly developed plant breeds fall within the
terms of § 101").
238. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-19709, at 5 (1952)
and H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
239. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146
(1989).
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The U.S. Constitution requires it, and the benefits from
harmonization, improved patent quality, and reduced prices
due to healthy competition for subject matter in the global
public domain, are significant. Elimination of the hypocritical
and imperialistic practice of denying the value and legitimacy
of foreign knowledge or use simply because it did not occur
within U.S. borders is also long overdue. Changing the
definition of prior art is not a complete solution to the problems
engendered by patents covering foreign knowledge or use;
however, it is a necessary action for the United States to take
in this small, small world.
